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“For let it be agreed that a government is republican in proportion as
every member composing it has his equal voice in the direction of its
concerns . . . .”
–Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816
I.

INTRODUCTION

In August 2011, Congress passed a strange piece of legislation
intended to bind itself into the future. In spite of persistently high
1
unemployment and an unremarkable deficit-to-GDP ratio, and in
spite of public polling that consistently showed that creating jobs was
2
the American public’s top priority, politicians inside the infamous
Washington “Beltway” had spent months locked in a debate over ways
to cut deficits and balance the federal budget—policies that would
not create jobs and by some estimates would put millions out of
3
work. This debate came to a head as Republicans refused to raise
the nation’s debt ceiling without substantial budget cuts. Unable to
come to terms, our “leaders” in Washington punted.
4
The Budget Control Act of 2011 raised the debt ceiling and
enacted $917 billion in budget cuts over ten years without raising any
5
new revenue. Further, the law created a special bipartisan “Super
*
The author is Counsel with Demos. Portions of this text have been previously
published in a variety of reports or articles by the author. The author would like to
thank several Demos colleagues for their roles in developing the ideas contained in
this article: David Callahan, J. Mijin Cha, Lisa Danetz, Anthony Kammer, Liz
Kennedy, and Brenda Wright; several others who have inspired me throughout my
career working on campaign finance issues: Blair Bowie, Derek Cressman, Owen Fiss,
and Robert Post; and, finally, the colleagues who generously reviewed drafts of this
article: Mark Alexander, Lee Drutman, Johanna Kalb, Carlin Meyer, John Paul
Rollert, and Kate Shaw.
1
See U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited
May 14, 2013); Paul Krugman, The Mostly Solved Deficit Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2013, 3:17 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/10
/the-mostly-solved-deficit-problem/.
2
Frank Newport, Americans Give Guns, Immigration Reform Low Priority Creating
Jobs and Growing the Economy Get Highest Priority, GALLUP POLITICS May 7, 2013,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162347/
americans-give-guns-immigration-reform-low-priority.aspx.
3
Adam Hersh & Sarah Ayers, Disinvesting America, Apr. 14, 2011,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/04/14/9485/disinvest
ing-in-america/.
4
Budget Control Act of 2011 (“BCA”), Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
5
See Alec Hamilton and Richard Yeh, Explainer: The Debt Deal—What Happens
Next and What’s on the Chopping Block?, WNYC Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.wnyc.org
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Committee” to further reduce the deficit, and specified that if the two
major parties could not agree on $1.2 trillion worth of additional cuts
by January 2, 2013, a series of automatic cuts were to take place—
6
known as the “sequester.” The sequester cuts were formulaic, largely
applying across the board.
The idea was that these cuts would be so odious to both sides—
draconian cuts to social services to offend Democrats, deep cuts to
the military to anger Republicans—that it would force them to the
table to craft a more reasonable deal. Of course, there was no deal
and the cuts ensued. In early 2013, these cuts began to have a real
impact on Americans’ lives. The White House predicted that 70,000
7
students would lose access to Head Start benefits. Cancer patients
8
on Medicare started being turned away from oncology clinics.
Unemployment benefits were cut by more than 10 percent for two
9
million Americans. Local housing authorities stopped issuing rental
vouchers for the homeless, and even rescinded previously issued
10
And Air Force bases cut down on training flights for
vouchers.
11
pilots.
Then, in April 2013, the $637 million in Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) budget cuts under the sequester forced the
agency to furlough or reduce hours for 50,000 employees, including
12
15,000 air traffic controllers.
In the following days, flights were
/articles/its-free-country/2011/aug/03/debt-deal-so-far/.
6
Bipartisan Policy Center, The Sequester Explained (Nov. 2011),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files
/BCA%20Sequester%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
7
Fact Sheet: Examples of How the Sequester Would Impact Middle Class Families, Jobs
and Economic Security, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, (2013), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/08/fact-sheet-exampleshow-sequester-would-impact-middle-class-families-job.
8
See Sequester Cuts Hitting Cancer Patients (NBC television broadcast Apr. 27,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news
/51689112/#51689112.
9
Lisa Rein, Sequester Means 11 Percent Cut In Unemployment Benefits, WASH. POST
(Apr. 8, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federaleye/wp/2013/04/08/sequesters-means-11-percent-cut-in-unemployment-benefits/.
10
Pam Fessler, Sequester Puts Some Needing Housing Aid ‘Back To Square One’, NPR,
Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/04/30/180100067
/sequester-puts-some-needing-housing-aid-back-to-square-one.
11
Larry Abramson, Sequester Has Air Force Clipping Its Wings, NPR May 11, 2013,
http://www.npr.org/2013/05/11/183014086/sequester-has-air-force-clipping-itswings.
12
Sequester Budget Cuts To Hit FAA, May Trigger Nationwide Delays, CBS N.Y. Apr.
21, 2013, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/04/21
/sequester-budget-cuts-hit-faa-may-ground-flights/.
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delayed and cancelled and airline passengers found themselves
13
stranded for hours at a time. Politicians, of course, stepped bravely
to the microphone and said, “Sorry, but this is the course we’ve
chosen. We all need to tighten our belts in these tough times.” Well,
no. Congress sprung swiftly into action; and by May 1, President
Obama had signed legislation to redirect the spending cuts so that
14
the FAA could go back to full capacity. Airline travel returned to
15
normal.
This story raises several questions, all of which bear upon an
important feature of our current democracy. Why was Congress
debating ways to reduce deficits in the first place when the American
people have said consistently since the nadir of the Great Recession
that their first priority is to put their friends and neighbors back to
16
work? Why in the scope of that debate did Congress focus so heavily
on cutting spending and barely consider ways to raise trillions of
dollars more revenue? Why did the cuts that Congress enacted fall
17
disproportionately on the backs of the neediest citizens?
And,
finally, why did Congress rush to appease a certain segment of the
population—regular air travelers—while ignoring the much more
dire conditions of those whose very livelihoods were threatened by
the sequester?
13

Genevieve Shaw Brown, Matt Gutman, Sarah Herndon, and Sarah Parnass,
Sequester Cuts, Resulting Furloughs Cause Flight Delays, ABC NEWS Apr. 22, 2013,
http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/forced-furloughs-flight-delays/story?id=19013206.
14
Josh Lederman, Obama Signs Bill to Fix Flight Delays Stemming from Spending Cuts
that Led to FAA Furloughs, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS May 1, 2013,
http://news.yahoo.com/obama-signs-bill-fix-flight-delays-stemming-spending192139192.html.
15
Keith Laing, Flight Delays Peter Out as Air Tower Staffing Returns to Normal, THE
HILL May 11, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/tsa/299145flight-delays-peter-out-as-air-tower-staffing-returns-to-normal.
16
Some might argue that a significant number of voters see deficit reduction as
a way to create jobs, as opposed to a competing priority. First, economists have
pointed out that this argument has little to no basis in fact or experience. See, e.g.,
Dean Baker, Deficit Reduction Won’t Create Jobs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Feb. 10,
2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/02/10
/deficit-reduction-wont-create-jobs. More important, when asked to choose directly
between cutting the deficit and other measures clearly intended to spur job creation,
the majority of the public chooses the latter. See, e.g., J. Mijin Cha, Why is Washington
Reducing the Deficit Instead of Creating Jobs?, DEMOS Dec. 7, 2012,
http://www.demos.org/publication/why-washington-reducing-deficit-insteadcreating-jobs.
17
See, e.g., Kelsey Sheehy, Sequester Cuts Gut Schools Serving Neediest Students, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT May 28, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/education
/blogs/high-school-notes/2013/05/28/sequester-cuts-gut-schools-serving-needieststudents.
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This article presents one answer to these questions, an answer
grounded in the troubling relationship between wealth inequality
and democratic representation in the United States. Drawing on
compelling recent political science evidence, I will argue that the
wealthy have systemically different policy preferences than the
general public; that government in the United States responds
differentially (and sometimes exclusively) to the policy preferences of
the wealthy; that this skewed responsiveness has led to economic
policies that favor the already-rich; and that this is substantially due to
the outsized influence of a small minority of wealthy donors who
largely determine who runs for office and whom is elected to
positions of power. Ultimately, the United States is caught in a
vicious cycle wherein the wealthy dominate the democratic process,
use their political power to craft favorable economic rules, and then
channel their increased riches back into further political control.
Further, I argue that our current predicament is due not to the
American public being unaware of the problem or unwilling to take
action, but rather to the current structure of American constitutional
law. Specifically, over the past four decades, the U.S. Supreme Court
has eviscerated key protections that prevent wealthy interests and
individuals from translating economic might directly into political
power. In the process, the Court has turned the First Amendment
into a tool for use by the wealthy to dominate the political process,
and the key barrier to democratizing the role of money in politics.
The justices—often (but not always) with bare majorities—have done
this by adhering to a crude libertarian orthodoxy and ignoring the
central place of political equality in American history and
constitutional tradition.
Finally, I will argue that the best way to reverse the current
vicious cycle is to transform the Court’s jurisprudence around money
in politics and empower the People to act through democratic means
to create a democracy in which the strength of a citizen’s voice does
not depend upon the size of her wallet.
II. THE DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE OF THE WEALTHY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
A. The Wealthy Have Different Policy Preferences
My argument starts with a premise so basic that it may seem
unremarkable. Common sense dictates that the wealthiest Americans
may hold different preferences and priorities than average-earning
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citizens. The wealthy, after all, do not look, live, or work like typical
members of the general public, so why should they think like them?
This premise, while perhaps obvious, is critical. If the wealthy
held substantially the same views—or the same distribution of views,
more accurately—as the general public, then their outsized influence
18
on government policy, while still unfair, would not skew policy
outcomes, and so might not be a matter of pressing concern for nonwealthy citizens.
Recently, social scientists have put this foundational premise to
the test. In an important 2012 book called Affluence and Influence:
19
Economic Inequality and Political Power in America, Princeton political
scientist Martin Gilens examined the policy preferences of Americans
up and down the income spectrum and studied government
responsiveness to their concerns. I shall return to Gilens’s central
findings about responsiveness below, but for now I will simply note
that he did indeed report significant differences in public opinion
20
based upon wealth. These differences exist in spite of the fact that
Gilens was not able to study those he considered “truly rich.” Due to
data limitations, he focused on Americans at the 90th income
percentile, earning at least $135,000 per year in 2010 (whom he
21
refers to as “the affluent”).
A more recent study called Democracy and the Policy Preferences of
22
Wealthy Americans takes an important step towards solving the data
problem that Gilens identifies, and gives us an unprecedented
window into the opinions of the very wealthy—a population that is
extremely difficult to study. In 2011, study authors worked with
experienced outreach experts at the University of Chicago to
interview a representative sample of very wealthy respondents in the
Chicago metropolitan area. Interviewees had a mean wealth of $14
million, a median wealth of $7.5 million, and an average yearly

18

See infra Part II.B.
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
20
Id. at 78 (“Low- and high-income respondents express comparable levels of
support (within 5 percentage points) on about one-third of the proposed policy
changes in my dataset, and middle- and high-income respondents agree on about
half the proposed changes.”).
21
Id. at 2.
22
Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013), available at
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jnd260/cab/CAB2012%20-%20Page1.pdf
[hereinafter Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans].
19
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23

income of slightly more than $1 million.
The study confirms and extends Gilens’s findings, reporting that
the policy preferences of the very rich differ substantially from those
of the general public—especially on key questions about how to
structure the economy. Let’s take as our first example the question
posed above—whether government should prioritize creating jobs or
reducing the deficit. Polling over the past few years has shown that
the general public has been consistently more concerned with job
creation and economic growth than with reducing the deficit, often
24
by two-to-one margins or more.
The wealthy, on the other hand, regularly list deficit reduction
as a higher priority than do their less-wealthy peers. The authors of
Policy Preferences reported that in their survey of the very rich, “[o]ne
third (32%) of all open-ended responses mentioned budget deficits
or excessive government spending, far more than mentioned any
other issue,” and, while a large percentage of respondents listed
unemployment and education as very important problems, “each of
these problems was mentioned as the most important by only 11%,
making them a distant second to budget deficits among the concerns
25
of wealthy Americans.” This finding is confirmed by a September
2012 Economist survey in which respondents earning more than
$100,000 per year were more than twice as likely as middle- or lowerincome respondents to name the budget deficit as the most
26
important issue to them. The deficit was the issue listed as most
important by the largest percentage of the wealthy, except for “the
economy” more generally, which was listed as most important by all
27
income groups.
This disparity is not an aberration. The Policy Preferences study
demonstrates that there are significant differences across a range of
issues related to the role that government should play in the
economy. More than three times the percentage of the general
public (68%) than the wealthy (19%) believe that “the government
23

Id. at 53.
David Callahan & J. Mijin Cha, Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the
Affluent and Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America, DEMOS (Feb. 2013), at 5–
6, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Demos-Stacked-Deck.pdf;
see also J. Mijin Cha, supra note 16.
25
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 55.
26
YouGov, The Economist/YouGov Poll: September 29-October 1, 2012, at 6, YOUGOV
(2012),
http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/xbqkxc7r1n
/econTabReport.pdf.
27
Id.
24
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in Washington ought to see to it that everyone who wants to work can
28
find a job.” Nearly twice the percentage of the public (78%) than
the wealthy (40%) support a minimum wage “high enough so that no
29
family with a full time worker falls below the official poverty line.” A
majority of the public believes that “the federal government should
provide jobs for everyone able and willing to work who cannot find a
job in private employment,” whereas just 8% of wealthy respondents
30
agree.
In the Economist poll cited above, 18% of respondents
making less than $40,000 per year listed social security as the most
31
important issue, whereas just 1% of the wealthy chose social security.
There is still plenty of research to be done on this important
topic. For example, it is not clear exactly why preferences differ so
sharply; how much of the difference is a result of diverging
experiences and worldviews producing different conceptions of the
32
public good, and how much is bald self-interest?
But, so far,
rigorous analysis confirms common senseon key questions
regarding how to structure our economy, the wealthy hold
significantly different opinions and preferences than everyone else.
B. Government Responds Mostly to the Preferences of the Wealthy
The differing policy preferences of the wealthy would not be
cause for concern if their actual influence on public policy accorded
with their numbers. The top one percent—or one tenth of one
percent—may desire very different outcomes than the broad public;
but by definition there are not very many people in this elite cadre,
and so they would not be able to achieve their desired ends without
convincing a large number of their fellow citizens of the wisdom of
their preferences. This is how we would hope a democracy—
characterized by a rough form of political equality consistent with the
principle of one person, one vote—would operate.
It will surprise no one that in fact the wealthy are able to exert
disproportionate influence on the political process. But the degree
28

Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 57.
Id.
30
Id.
31
The Economist/YouGov Poll: September 29-October 1, 2012, supra note 26.
32
In a piece that cites the Policy Preferences study, Paul Krugman writes, “the years
since we turned to austerity have been dismal for workers but not at all bad for the
wealthy, who have benefited from surging profits and stock prices even as long-term
unemployment festers.” Paul Krugman, Austerity Doctrine Only Benefits the Wealthy,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE Apr. 26, 2013, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook
/article/Krugman-Austerity-doctrine-only-benefits-the-4466944.php.
29
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of disparity of influence that Gilens documented in Affluence and
Influence, when he set out to measure what he calls the
“preference/policy link” across the economic spectrum, may surprise
33
even some of the most seasoned political observers. Gilens writes:
The American government does respond to the public’s
preferences, but that responsiveness is strongly tilted toward
the most affluent citizens.
Indeed, under most
circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which
34
policies the government does or doesn’t adopt. . . .
....
The complete lack of government responsiveness to the
preferences of the poor is disturbing and seems consistent
only with the most cynical views of American politics . . . .
[M]edian-income Americans fare no better than the poor
when their policy preferences diverge from those of the
35
well-off.
He continues by describing explicitly the power of the preferences of
the affluent to override those of the much more numerous poor and
middle class:
[F]or Americans below the top of the income distribution,
any association between preferences and policy outcomes is
likely to reflect the extent to which their preferences
36
coincide with those of the affluent. . . .
....
We saw above that less-well-off Americans have little
influence over policy outcomes when their preferences
diverge from those of the affluent. [Additional data
described] show that this is true not only for the poor and
the middle class considered separately . . . but for those
policies on which the poor and middle class are closely
37
aligned in opposition to the affluent.
This is truly a remarkable finding: when the preferences of the
wealthiest 10 percent of Americans conflict with that of the rest of the
population, the 10 percent trumps the 90 percent.
While the affluent are quite dominant across the board, the
divergence of influence is not equal across policy domains. Gilens

33
34
35
36
37

GILENS, supra note 19, at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
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finds that “the starkest difference in responsiveness to the affluent
and the middle class occurs on economic policy, a consequence of
high-income Americans’ stronger opposition to taxes and corporate
38
regulation . . . .”
He concludes that “we would expect greater
representational equality in the economic sphere to result in a higher
minimum wage, more generous unemployment benefits, stricter
corporate regulation (including the oil and gas industries in
39
particular), and a more progressive personal tax regime in general.”
Finally, Gilens notes that matters seem to be getting worse. “The
analyses of change over time,” he describes, “do reveal an important
general trend: the strengthening of policy responsiveness for affluent
40
Americans.” This is important because it suggests that government
responsiveness to the wealthy is not a constant (and some would say
inevitable) state, but rather is itself responsive to particular policy or
economic conditions.
In the end, his exhaustive study of the “preference/policy” link
in the United States leads Gilens to some fairly stark and depressing
conclusions about the state of American democracy. At various
points throughout the book he writes that “[t]he concentration of
political influence among Americans at the top of the income
distribution is incompatible with the core democratic principle of
41
political equality,” and “[t]he patterns of responsiveness found in
previous chapters often correspond more closely to a plutocracy than
42
to a democracy.”
C. Economic Policy: By and for the One Percent
The consequences of a wealthy elite with distinct preferences
and priorities, especially on core economic issues, and a government
that responds disproportionately (or exclusively) to the preferences
of this elite segment of society are not hard to predict. We would
expect a series of policies that benefit economic incumbents rather
than fostering cross-class opportunity and mobility.
As Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson document extensively in their
43
2010 book Winner-Take-All Politics, this is exactly what the past several
38

Id. at 101.
GILENS, supra note 19, at 117.
40
Id. at 193.
41
Id. at 83.
42
Id. at 234.
43
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
39
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decades have wrought in the United States. We have entered an era
of profound economic inequality in this country. Hacker and
Pierson write:
A generation ago, the United States was a recognizable, if
somewhat more unequal, member of the cluster of affluent
democracies known as mixed economies, where fast growth
was widely shared. No more. Since around 1980, we have
drifted away from that mixed-economy cluster, and traveled
a considerable distance toward another: the capitalist
oligarchies, like Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, with their much
44
greater concentration of economic bounty.
Exhibit A is the overwhelming share of national economic
growth that has accrued to the very top of the income scale over the
past few decades. Citing a Congressional Budget Office report
covering the years 1979–2006, Hacker and Pierson reported that
average after-tax income of the richest one percent increased by
45
Income of the poorest 20%, in
nearly 260% over that period.
contrast, rose only a modest 10%, and those in the middle quintile
46
But, even these latter increases are due entirely to
rose 21%.
working more hours, not sharing in the gains of increased
productivity. “Without those additional hours and income,” the
authors report, “households in the middle of the distribution would
have barely nudged up at all. The incomes of households at the
47
bottom would actually have fallen.”
More recent data provides no solace. Economist Emmanuel
Saez has reported that between 2009 and 2011, the real income of
99% of the American population shrank by 0.4%, but the top one
48
percent saw gains of 11.2%. According to the Pew Research Center,
during the same period, the mean net worth of the eight million
households in the top 7% of the wealth distribution increased by
28%, while mean wealth of the remaining households dropped by
49
4%.
(2010).
44
Id. at 3–4.
45
Id. at 22.
46
Id.
47
Id. (citations omitted).
48
Emmanual Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of the Top Incomes in the United
States (Updated with 2011 Estimates), Jan. 23, 2013, http://elsa.berkeley.edu
/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2011.pdf.
49
The Uneven Economic Recovery: Wealth of Upper 7% Rises, While Less-Affluent See
Declines, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/dailynumber/the-uneven-economic-recovery-wealth-of-upper-7-rises-while-less-affluent-see-
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The most common defense of economic inequality is that it is
merit-based. The primary proof of this is that it is fluid, responsive to
talent and effort rather than locked-in by happenstance of birth. The
United States may be unequal, say some, but it is mobile. In America,
we don’t seek equality of outcome, but rather pride ourselves in
equality of opportunity.
Unfortunately, Hacker and Pierson demonstrate that this, while
perhaps true in a bygone era, is no longer the case:
The American Dream portrays the United States as a
classless society where anyone can rise to the top, regardless
of family background. Yet, there is more intergenerational
mobility in Australia, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany,
Spain, France, and Canada. In fact, of affluent countries
studied, only Britain and Italy have lower intergenerational
mobility than the United States does (and they are basically
even with the U.S.). . . . In the United States, more than
half of the earnings advantage (or disadvantage) of fathers
is passed on to sons. In Canada, only about a fifth or less is.
And, almost all of the difference is accounted for by the fact
that Americans are much more likely to be stuck at the
50
bottom or secure at the top than are Canadians.
Why is this so? Why has inequality increased so dramatically and
mobility stalled? Hacker and Pierson dismiss several of the typical
51
explanations and place the blame squarely with government
policies. These policies come, broadly, in two forms—one obvious
and a second much less so.
The first type of government policy affects economic outcomes
directly through taxes and other distributive (or redistributive)
means. By examining what Hacker and Pierson term the “truly
advantaged,” they show that the extremely wealthy “are not simply
richer because their paychecks have grown; they’re richer because
52
government taxes them much less heavily than it once did.” As a
prime example, the authors report that “[t]he top 0.1 percent had
about 7.3 percent of the total national after-tax income in 2000, up
from 1.2 percent in 1970. If the effect of taxes on their income had
remained what it was in 1970, they would have had about 4.5 percent

declines/.
50
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 43, at 29 (2010).
51
They examine and reject “skill-biased technological change,” for example. Id.
at 34–40.
52
Id. at 48.
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53

of after-tax income.”
In addition, by failing to update existing
policies (a phenomenon the authors term “drift”), “the percentage
by which government taxes and benefits reduced inequality fell . . . by
54
more than a quarter” between 1980 and 2003. A new international
study also reports that in countries in which the wealthy have
experienced sizable gains in income share over the past five decades,
55
top earners also experienced stark reductions in marginal tax rates.
The second type of government policy that Hacker and Pierson
highlight is less obvious in its impact on economic equality but likely
more profound. Cass Sunstein has pointed out, in another context,
that the essential problem with the infamous Supreme Court decision
56
Lochner v. New York inhered in its assumption that markets were prepolitical and that government regulation always and everywhere
represented (presumably unjust) interference with this blissful state
57
of nature. The reality is that governments always and everywhere
create and shape markets by setting the rules of the game. The only
questions are what these rules will be and whom they will benefit.
Hacker and Pierson build upon this insight, pointing out that
through weak rules governing the right to form a union, lack of
regulations on executive pay, the revocation of basic regulations on
capital markets, and more, the U.S. government has structured an
economy well-tailored to accelerate economic inequality and frustrate
58
the ambitions of working families. To this list, one might add the
59
declining real value of the minimum wage, receding per-pupil
60
investment in public higher education, tax loopholes, and direct
subsidies benefiting large corporations at the expense of small
61
businesses.
53

Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
Id. at 52 (citations omitted).
55
Dylan Matthews, Surprise! When the Rich Get Richer, Taxes Go Lower, WASH. POST
BLOG
(May
28,
2013,
1:02
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/28/surprise-when-the-rich-get-richer-taxes-golower/?wprss=rss_ezra-klein.
56
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
57
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); Cass
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1397
(1994) [hereinafter Political Equality and Unintended Consequences].
58
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 43, at 54–72.
59
Callahan & Cha, supra note 24, at 12–13.
60
See, e.g., John Quinterno & Viany Orozco, The Great Cost Shift: How Higher
Education Cuts Undermine the Future Middle Class, DEMOS (Apr. 3, 2012), at 14–15,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/TheGreatCostShift_Demos.
pdf.
61
See, e.g., Joseph Rotella & Dennis Van Roekel, How Everyone Else Pays for Big
54
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The bottom line is that public policy inevitably shapes our
economy, and it either does so in ways that foster opportunity and
mobility or it puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the already-haves.
The accumulated evidence demonstrates that at least since the late
1970s, U.S. economic policy has accelerated wealth inequality and
stalled economic mobility.
III. HOW THE VICIOUS CYCLE SPINS
Why, in a democracy—where each citizen in theory has equal
voting power, and where votes are the ultimate arbiter of who ascends
to political power—would a government comprised of elected
officials respond so differentially to a small group of citizens and
consistently craft policy designed to serve this elite?
A. The Wealthy Exhibit Greater Participation in All Aspects of Civic
and Political Life . . .
One answer is that the members of this small group are much
more active citizens. Voter registration and turnout rates consistently
62
rise with income and wealth.
In a landmark study called The
Unheavenly Chorus (which is itself an update of a prior study called
Voice and Equality), three scholars document the various ways in which
socio-economic status is positively correlated with political
63
participation even beyond these basic metrics. In a 2008 survey, for
example, the median income of registered voters was 9% higher than
respondents as a whole; and campaign workers had incomes a full
64
27% higher than was typical for the sample.
The positive
correlation holds true for group membership as well. “[T]hose at the
top of the [socio-economic status] ladder,” the authors report, “are
much more likely than those lower down to be affiliated with a
political organization and to indicate that they have attended a
meeting, that they have been active . . . or that they have served as a

Business’s Tax Breaks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Apr. 5, 2012,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/04/05/how-everyone-else-pays-forbig-businesss-tax-breaks; Robert P. Murphy, Welfare for the Rich:
The Wealthy Receive Billions of Dollars in Government Subsidies Each Year, THE
FOUNDATION
FOR
ECONOMIC
EDUCATION
Apr.
1,
2007,
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/welfare-for-the-rich.
62
See, e.g., Callahand & Cha, supra note 24, at 17.
63
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY
CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2012).
64
Id. at 240–41.
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board member or officer of an organization that takes stands in
65
politics.”
B. . . . But Their Outsized Influence is Most Pronounced When They
Spend Money
The reality, however, is that because the wealthy are so few and
the rest of the population so many, even large differences in voting
rates and other forms of civic participation would not likely, on their
own, lead directly to the extreme differential in responsiveness
described above. The top 1% of Americans would have to vote at
twenty times the rate of the bottom quintile in order to simply cancel
out the poorest Americans’ votes; but this is not possible since the
discrepancy in turnout between the top and bottom quintiles has
historically hovered around 30%—a significant gap to be sure, but
not enough to enable the wealthy to simply vote their way to more
66
Other forms of civic participation can have a multiplier
power.
effect, enabling well-off citizens to influence fellow citizens and raise
the profile of certain issues or causes. But, as the authors of
Unheavenly Chorus point out, even if the wealthy have more time to
volunteer with citizen organizations, canvass their neighbors, or join
67
boards, time is a finite resource.
It is when the wealthy make use of their greatest comparative
advantage, by breaking out their checkbooks, that they can multiply
their influence in virtually unlimited ways. It is the role of money in
contemporary American politics that, more than any other single
factor, drives government’s differential and undemocratic
68
responsiveness to the wealthy.
Broadly speaking, there are three basic ways to use money to
influence policy in a democracy. One can spend money to shape
public opinion such that policymakers responsive to such opinion will
enact favored rules. One can spend money to help place into
positions of power people who are sympathetic to one’s views and
65

Id. at 377.
Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1972-2004,
Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
(Aug. 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas
/dept/politics/faculty/nagler/apsa2006_rv7.pdf).
67
SCHLOZMAN, VERBA, & BRADY, supra note 63.
68
Gilens comes to the same conclusion himself, noting that “any effort to
strengthen the influence of less-affluent Americans over federal policy must address
the highly skewed sources of individual campaign donations.” GILENS, supra note 19
at 247.
66
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preferences—that is, help elect public officials. And, one can spend
money to influence those officials once they are in power, through
lobbying, further campaign contributions, or even outright bribery.
No doubt, each of these types of spending contributes to the vicious
cycle I am describing in this Article. Nonetheless, for several reasons,
I will focus on the use of money to help elect public officials.
I do not focus on the use of money to shape public opinion for
two basic reasons. First, as Gilens and Page have demonstrated in
their research, substantial differences in policy preferences between
the wealthy and average-earning citizens persist, especially on
economic issues. So, although wealthy donors do spend billions of
dollars attempting to shape public opinion on many issues of direct
69
relevance to the economy—such as the importance of deficits, the
70
existence (or fabrication) of global warming, and the best strategies
71
for public education —this spending has not caused the preferences
72
of the general public to align with those of wealthy activists. Second,
this problem is extraordinarily difficult to solve, and it is not
immediately clear how the solution recommended below can be
applied.
I do not focus on attempts to influence already elected officials
for a few reasons. Outright bribery, of course, is already illegal and
73
by most accounts fairly rare in American politics. Lobbying, on the
other hand, is a multi-billion dollar industry and a legitimate
74
candidate for the role of prime mover in the vicious cycle. But, it is
69

See, e.g., Max Berley & Brian Faler, Peterson’s $1 Billion Bet Shows Return as Deficit
Concerns Rise, BLOOMBERG July 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0701/peterson-s-1-billion-investment-shows-returns-as-deficit-concerns-mount.html.
70
See, e.g., Koch Industries: Still Fueling Climate Denial 2011 Update, GREENPEACE
Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/media-center/reports/KochIndustries-Still-Fueling-Climate-Denial-2011-Update/.
71
See, e.g., Valarie Strauss, Bill Gates Expands Influence—and Money—Into Higher
Education, WASH. POST July 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answersheet/wp/2013/07/15/bill-gates-expands-influence-and-money-into-highereducation/.
72
See, e.g., discussion in Section II.A, supra.
73
See, e.g., Stephen K. Medvic, There is Very Little Corruption in U.S. Politics, N.Y.
TIMES Apr. 3, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/03/are-richpoliticians-less-corruptible/there-is-very-little-corruption-in-us-politics (“[I]n any
given year, only a minuscule percentage of the more than 500,000 elected officials in
the United States are brought up on charges of corruption.”).
74
See, e.g., Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying: Explaining the Growth
of
Corporate
Political
Activity
in
Washington
D.C.,
LEEDRUTMAN.COM,
http://www.leedrutman.com/uploads/2/3/0/1/2301208/business_of_america_is_l
obbying.pdf; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 43. The impact of lobbying,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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my view that helping place people into positions of authority who
share one’s ideological perspective, worldview, and general life
experiences is a more powerful way to shape policy than is
persuading those already in power to take a desired position. The
former strategy tends to shape the field of alternatives and the latter
tends to influence decisions within that already-determined field of
75
acceptable outcomes.
I acknowledge that my view about the primary role of the
influence of money on elections versus on politicians is a contested
76
one. More important, the role of lobbying is largely beyond the
scope of this Article because the story of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence discussed below and the solutions that I propose do
not touch directly on the role of lobbying, at least in the shorter
term.
C. Wealthy Donors Shape Election Contests
Wealthy donors’ first and key mechanism for influencing policy
is by determining who runs for office and who wins elections in the
United States.
1. Who Runs: The Wealth Primary
Over the past several decades, the cost of running for office in
77
the United States has increased dramatically. In the 2012 election
cycle, the average winning U.S. House candidate raised more than
$1.6 million and the average winning Senate candidate raised nearly
78
$10.5 million. Fundraising figures for the most competitive races
75

See discussion infra Part IV.C (expanding upon this view).
Gilens’s work provides some evidence for this view. In his chapter about
interest groups, he writes that his “findings suggest that representational inequality
cannot be blamed on the power of organized interests. Particular groups do
undermine the interests of the public on specific issues, but on other occasions
interest groups align with public preferences (even if those groups are motivated by
their own narrow concerns).” GILENS, supra note 19, at 124. He also finds specific
evidence that, counter to expectations, interest groups do not in fact accelerate the
gap in the preference / policy link between rich and poor because there is no
significant alignment between the policy preferences of interest groups and the
wealthy. GILENS, supra note 19 at 136. Others, however, argue that lobbying has a
profound impact on policy in ways that benefit wealthy, entrenched interests. Yale
Law Professor Heather Gerken, for example, argues that lobbying must be
considered together with campaign finance. Heather Gerken, Keynote Address:
Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (2011).
77
See, e.g., Senate Campaign Expenditures, 1974-2010, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE,
http://www.cfinst.org/data/pdf/VitalStats_t5.pdf.
78
Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, Billion-Dollar Democracy: The Unprecedented Role of
76
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were considerably higher; candidates for the U.S. Senate seat in
Massachusetts, for example, raised a combined total of nearly $76
79
million.
This high cost of entry means that well before facing the voters,
while sitting in a quiet living room deciding whether to mount a
campaign, any prospective candidate must ask herself two critical
questions: How much money can I raise? And, where will I get that
money? In a May 2013 speech at Yale University, U.S. Senator Chris
Murphy, referring to the four to six hours per day he was required to
dial for dollars, added a similar question to the mix: “Are you willing
80
to become a telemarketer for 24 months?”
This might not be such a problem if candidates for elected office
were raising the vast majority of their money from a broad range of
the constituents they hope to represent. In that case, fundraising
would be a proxy for public support and those with the best chance
of winning would earn the right to face the voters in primaries or
general elections. But, in reality, candidates tend to depend upon a
tiny number of wealthy donors to fund their campaigns. Candidates
for the U.S. Senate in 2012, for example, raised 64% of their funds in
contributions of at least $1,000—from just 0.04% of the U.S.
81
population.
The situation does not change if we go back several years, or just
look at primary elections. For the 2002 congressional primary
elections, for example, 73% of all federal candidate contributions
came in contributions of at least $1,000 from just 0.07% of the voting
82
age population. If anything, as these numbers suggest, candidates
are likely to be more dependent upon a small network of large
donors in primary campaigns, before the general voting public is fully
engaged in the race.
Money in the 2012 Elections, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (January 2013), at
18,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications
/BillionDollarDemocracy_Demos.pdf.
79
Most
Expensive
Races:
2012
Overview,
OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topraces.php?cycle=2012&display=allcands
(last visited May 14, 2013).
80
Paul Blumenthal, Chris Murphy: ‘Soul-Crushing’ Fundraising is Bad for Congress,
HUFFINGTON POST May 7, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/07/chrismurphy-fundraising_n_3232143.html.
81
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 13.
82
Adam Lioz, The Wealth Primary: The Role of Big Money in the 2002 Congressional
PIRG
EDUCATION
FUND
(Oct.
2002)
at
10–12,
Primaries,
U.S.
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/FO6yyVgGizvg2SBwWcd08g/roleofmo
ney2003.pdf [hereinafter The Wealth Primary].
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This means that as a practical matter, the three fundraising
questions for candidates posed above can be merged into one: do I
have access to a substantial network of wealthy donors who can afford
to make large contributions (of $1,000 or more) to my campaign?
One would assume that those who can afford to write checks of
$1,000, $2,000, or more are wealthier than average-earning citizens.
Two pieces of data confirm this common-sense conclusion. First, a
nationwide survey found that 81% of those who gave contributions of
at least $200 during the 1996 congressional elections reported annual
83
family incomes greater than $100,000.
Additionally, in Policy
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, the authors found that more than twothirds of the extremely wealthy respondents interviewed contributed
money to candidates or political organizations over the previous
twelve months, and more than one-fifth of them helped solicit or
84
“bundle” other people’s contributions.
Given this confluence of wealth and campaign financing, it
85
makes sense to speak of a coherent “donor class.” This donor class
has two critical features relevant for the purposes of this Article: it
holds systemically different policy preferences than the general
public and it wields tremendous, and arguably decisive, influence
over who runs effectively for office. This circumstance—and the
widespread knowledge of this circumstance among aspiring elected
officials—gives the donor class incredible power to shape the agenda
in Washington and in state capitals across the country.
The first type of power wielded by the donor class is the power to
set the alternatives by shaping the field of candidates. Our big-money
system helps wealthy donors do this in two main ways. First, it
narrows the field of viable candidates. Through a process that legal
scholars and advocates have called the “wealth primary,” large donors
act as gatekeepers, determining which types of aspiring public
86
servants are able to get on the playing field in a meaningful way.
Affluence and Influence author Martin Gilens recognizes this
phenomenon and writes that “[a]ffluent contributors . . . serve as a
political filter mechanism; without the support of a sufficient core of
well-off contributors, a prospective candidate has little chance of
83

Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 15.
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 54.
85
See generally Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy,
and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004).
86
See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1162 (1994); The
Wealth Primary, supra note 82.
84
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87

mounting a competitive campaign.” Qualified, credible candidates
who either lack access to networks of large donors or fail to shade
their positions in the proper direction are filtered out of the system,
dropping out of races, deciding not to run in the first place, or losing
88
primary elections. One stark example of how this filtering process
narrows the field is the notable lack of representatives in Congress
and state legislatures who have previously held working-class jobs. As
Nicholas Carnes reports in his new book White-Collar Government: The
Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making, more than half of
American citizens hold working-class jobs, and yet only 3% of state
legislators and less than 2% of members of Congress previously held
89
a similar job.
In filtering candidates, wealthy donors may also be adversely
affecting the overall quality of our representation. Aside from
denying us the talents of the broadest possible set of public servants,
we may actually be selecting politicians whose primary focus is raising
money rather than crafting public policy. As Senator Murphy noted,
“the skill of telemarketing does not translate into the skill of
90
governing.”
Second, the wealth primary system changes the candidates who
do run. Those wishing to secure a chance to appear before the voters
in a primary or general election are (often irresistibly) tempted to
align their policy positions and priorities with those of the narrow set
91
of people they court for large contributions.
Take the minimum wage as just one example. As discussed
above, the vast majority of Americans support a minimum wage that
92
is much higher than the current $7.25 per hour. But, few among
the donor class surveyed for the Policy Preferences study support a
87

GILENS, supra note 19, at 244.
Adam Lioz, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington: Qualified Candidates Shut Out
by
Big
Money,
U.S.
PIRG
EDUCATION
FUND
(Jan.
2003),
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/kg3KuycG2E8nlXOgCyKbTw/lookwho
snot1_03.pdf.
89
NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING (2013) at 4–5.
90
Opening Address by Senator Chris Murphy, Purchasing Power: Money,
Politics, and Inequality, 2013 Spring Convening of the Yale Institute for Social and
Policy
Studies,
available
at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=kLfVpET_r5A&list=PLqHnHG5X2PXAo8rhYsOVedp0V8Kiwnylh&index=3.
91
See, e.g., MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK
ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS (1995).
92
See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR
DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
88
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93

substantial increase. This creates both an advantage for candidates
who do not support the minimum wage, and an incentive for those
who do to shade or downplay their positions on the issue. To be
sure, in many districts this will not be a factor—the constituent
landscape is either so solidly for or against an increase that
candidates are unlikely to take a different position (and sophisticated
donors are unlikely to expect that they would). But, in more
competitive districts in which the sentiment of the electorate is less
certain, the subtle skewing of candidate positions to please
gatekeeper donors is more likely. And, on third or fourth tier issues
that are less electorally salient—because the electorate is less
knowledgeable or focused on those issues—the incentive to please
94
donors is even greater.
Some courageous candidates for federal office have talked
openly about this phenomenon. Miles Rapoport is the current
President of Demos and a former Connecticut state legislator and
95
Connecticut Secretary of State. In 1998, Rapoport ran for Congress,
and he described his experience dialing for dollars:
Every night I would lock myself in a room with a bag of
chips and some strong coffee and make my calls, homing in
on people who could ideally give me at least $500 or $1000
or more. And, when I was talking with these potential
donors I found that their problems and concerns weren’t
the same as the majority of folks I was looking to represent
in Congress. I heard a lot about how excessive regulations
were strangling their business or health care costs for their
workers were a real burden. I was running as a progressive
candidate and so my first instinct was to say, “now wait a
minute, that’s not exactly right.” But, my goal on the
phone was to get the contribution. So, by the end of the
night, I found myself saying things like “well, that’s an
interesting point you make and when I’m in Washington
you should come by and we can talk more about that.” I
wasn’t changing my positions, exactly, but there was
definitely a shift in emphasis, and I could feel myself
shifting as I spent more and more time talking to a very
narrow set of wealthy donors. My sense of what was pressing
93

Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 57.
This is because candidates can receive a benefit by appealing to donors
without paying a corresponding price with the electorate.
95
DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/miles-rapoport (last visited Sept. 29 2013). In
the interest of transparency, I should note here that Mr. Rapoport is the head of the
organization for which I work and hence, indirectly, my boss.
94
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and important may have been affected, and my sense of
what types of positions I needed to be open to in order to
96
win my race and get into Congress was certainly affected.
Senator Murphy echoed this experience, noting that when
making fundraising appeals, he’s “not call[ing] anyone who could
not drop at least $1,000,” people, he estimated, who make at least
97
$500,000 to $1 million per year.
I talked a lot more about carried interest inside of that call
room than I did in the supermarket . . . [The people I’m
calling] have fundamentally different problems than other
people. And in Connecticut especially, you spend a lot of
time on the phone with people who work in the financial
markets. And so you’re hearing a lot about problems that
bankers have and not a lot of problems that people who
work at the mill in Thomaston, Conn., have. You certainly
98
have to stop and check yourself.
Through controlling the wealth primary, the donor class is able
to both exert outsized influence on who runs for elected office and to
incentivize those who do run to take policy positions that are closer to
their preferences than to those of the general public. This is the first
key mechanism through which the wealthy are able to set the agenda
in legislatures across America.
2. Who Wins Elections
Of course, donors do not simply choose the players and then
walk off the field. The donor class engages actively, and largely
effectively, in giving its preferred candidates the best possible chance
to win elected office as well.
As noted, candidates for Congress typically raise a very large
percentage of their funds from a small minority of wealthy donors.
In 2012, both House and Senate candidates raised the majority of
their funds from individuals, as opposed to political action
99
committees (PACs) or other sources.
These individual
contributions came largely in high-dollar donations. House and
Senate candidates raised the majority of these funds in contributions

96

Mr. Rapoport delivered a version of these remarks at the Yale event covered by
the Huffington Post and cited supra, note 80. The author attempted to record the
remarks faithfully and received Mr. Rapoport’s approval on this text.
97
Blumenthal, supra note 80.
98
Id.
99
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 12–13.
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100

of at least $1,000.
Senate candidates raised 40% of these funds in
101
Just 25% of individual
contributions of at least $2,500.
contributions to House candidates and 21% to Senate candidates
102
came in contributions of less than $200.
One or two thousand
dollars may appear relatively insignificant in the context of
multimillion dollar campaigns, but when considering that median
103
household income in 2011 was $50,054, it would be a significant
percentage of discretionary income for an average-earning family,
and is likely well more than most families can afford to give to a
political candidate or cause.
The post-Citizens United explosion of outside spending has
further enhanced the power of large donors and increased the
influence of the super-wealthy in addition to the merely rich.
Approximately 20 percent of the total 2012 election spending
reported to the FEC was by outside groups, as opposed to candidates
104
or parties.
Of this reported outside spending, more than 60
percent was by Super PACs, which can raise unlimited funds from
105
individuals, corporations, unions, nonprofits, or other sources.
In 2012, 60 percent of Super PAC funding came from just 159
106
individuals and institutions contributing at least $1 million.
The
top thirty-two Super PAC donors, giving an average of $9.9 million
each, matched the $313 million that President Obama and Mitt
Romney raised from all of their small donors combined—at least 3.7
107
million people giving less than $200.
Focusing just on individuals, rather than including corporations
or other institutions, yields similar statistics. Just ninety-nine people,
who contributed at least $1 million to Super PACs, accounted for
108
nearly 60 percent of all individual contributions to the entities.
100

Id. at 13.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Income Gap Rose, Sign of Uneven Recovery Widening, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/us
/us-incomes-dropped-last-year-census-bureau-says.html.
104
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 3. Note that this figure is cited as approximate
because the FEC has promulgated updated figures since this report was published. It
is also important to note that due to inadequate reporting requirements, not all
funds spent to influence federal elections must be reported to the FEC. For more on
this, see id. at 6.
105
Id. at 4.
106
Id. at 8.
107
Id. at 9.
108
Id. at 10.
101
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Sheldon and Miriam Adelson were the largest Super PAC donors; the
109
Adelsons contributed nearly $92 million. Although this is clearly a
large sum, it is less than one-half of 1 percent of their net worth—the
equivalent of an average American family contributing $285. It
would take more than 320,000 average families to match the Adelson
110
family’s political giving.
After running the numbers on the first presidential election
cycle after Citizens United, Lee Drutman at the Sunlight Foundation
concluded that just 1% of 1% (one ten-thousandth) of the U.S.
population was responsible for more than 28% of all disclosed
political giving and spending in 2012—“a dubious new landmark” for
111
concentration of political clout.
“[C]andidates got more money
from a smaller percentage of the population,” Drutman notes, “than
112
any year for which we have data.” A group of elite donors that can
fit inside a decent-sized basketball arena is driving political
fundraising in a nation of more than 300 million people.
So, does all this money matter? Does it help candidates win
elections? The short answer is that raising and spending more money
certainly appears to give candidates the best chance to win an
election—but that money matters to the process either way. The
ability to raise and spend money can be an effective candidate filter
whether money is a key decisive in winning elections, or just
perceived to be by the active players in the political landscape.
There was a lot of talk coming out of the 2012 elections that
113
“money didn’t matter.”
In many of the high-profile races, the
candidates who spent the most or benefited from an influx of outside
114
And many of the biggest outside spenders
spending did not win.
had poor track records, dumping millions of dollars into losing races
115
and racking up generally poor win percentages.
109

Id.
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 10.
111
Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION June
24, 2013, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., Ezra Klein, We Got Way Too Excited Over Money in the 2012
Elections, WASH. POST May 6, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/06/we-got-way-too-excited-over-money-in-the-2012elections/.
114
Id.
115
The Sunlight Foundation reported, for example, that Karl Rove’s American
Crossroads had a 1.29% return on investment for the cycle. See Lindsay Young,
Outside Spenders’ Return on Investment, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTING GROUP (last
updated
Dec.
17,
2012),
http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012
110
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There is danger, however, in learning too large of a lesson from
a small sample of high-profile races in one election year. It certainly
appears to be the case that money plays an important role in
determining election outcomes, as a large percentage of the biggestspending candidates regularly win their races and several political
science studies have found that increases in spending do correlate
116
with increased vote share.
In the 2012 election cycle, for example, 84% of U.S. House
candidates and 67% of U.S. Senate “candidates who outspent their
117
general election opponents won their elections.”
If anything, this
winning percentage appears to be on the low side historically—
between 2004 and 2012 an average of 91% of high-spending House
candidates and 79% of similar Senate candidates won their general
118
election contests.
Winning House candidates raised 108% more
money than their major opponents and winning Senate candidates
119
raised more than 35% more than their major opponents.
Of course, skeptics will rightly claim that correlation should not
be confused with causation—and there are, indeed, several factors
that complicate the above picture.
Many federal general elections are not competitive because
districts are drawn to virtually assure a victory for one of the two
120
major political parties.
In this situation, we would expect the
assumptive victor to attract more contributions; and the fundraising
disparity is more likely the result of the final outcome than the cause
of it. On this point, it is worth noting that in primary elections—
where the partisan makeup of the district is a much smaller factor—
candidates who raise and spend the most money routinely win the

/return_on_investment/.
116
See, e.g., Alan S. Gerber, Does Campaign Spending Work?: Field Experiments Provide
Evidence and Suggest New Theory, 47 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 541 (2004); Gary C. Jacobson,
The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 469–91
(1978); Don P. Green & Jonathan S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent:
Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884
(1988); R.S. Erickson & T.R. Palfrey, Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory
and Data, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 595 (2000).
117
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 18.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 17.
120
The Cook Political Report, considered an authoritative source on competitive
races, lists 369 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives (85%) as “solid seats”
for either Democrats or Republicans for the 2014 election cycle. COOK POLITICAL
REPORT, http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings (accessed Sept. 1, 2013
at 9:27 AM).
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121

vast majority of races as well.
The “money follows a likely winner” argument, however, can be
applied more broadly. And, indeed, when we look just at close races,
defined as those decided within a ten-point margin, the picture is
more complex. In these races, 63.6% of House candidates and 50.0%
122
of Senate candidates who outspent their opponents won.
And,
when outside spending is factored in, only 48% of House candidates
and 19% of Senate candidates with a total spending edge won their
123
2012 races.
How do we explain these numbers? First, it is fairly clear that
campaign spending, like many other types of spending, has
124
diminishing returns. In the minority of close races where spending
by candidates and outside groups skyrockets, it is less likely that the
marginal dollar that puts one candidate over the top will lead to
victory.
Further, outside spending does not appear to be as clearly
125
correlated with victory as spending by the actual candidate.
One
reason for this is related to the concept of diminishing returns
outlined above. Outside spending tends to be concentrated in a
narrow set of highly competitive races where the overall amount of
126
money spent is extremely high.
Next, it may be that outside
spending organizations are simply not as effective at helping favored
candidates win as candidates themselves. This could be because they
tend to be national in scope and, therefore, are less familiar with
local voters and the best messaging or strategy needed to win. It
could be because many outside spending groups have goals beyond
(and sometimes above) electing a particular candidate and fealty to
these goals may undermine their electoral success (for example, if
the particular issue a group is focused on is not the best winning issue
for its preferred candidate). Some have even suggested that outside
groups are more concerned with expression and pleasing their
121

See, e.g., The Wealth Primary, supra note 82.
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 18.
123
Id.
124
See Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New
Evidence for Old Arguments, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI 2, 334–62, 337 (1990) (“[I]t is clear that
linear models of campaign spending effects are inadequate because diminishing
returns must apply to campaign spending.”) (internal citations omitted).
125
The numbers cited in this section strongly suggest this conclusion.
126
Lee Drutman, Outside Money in the Senate: One Map, Four Graphs, and
FOUNDATION
Oct.
24,
2012,
Seven
Takeaways,
SUNLIGHT
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/10/24/outside-money-in-the-senate/
(“Half of the outside money is in just four races.”).
122
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127

donors than actually winning campaigns.
But, even in these cases, the logical conclusion is certainly not
that money is not important. After all, a candidate needs to raise a
huge amount (and/or have a huge amount spent on his or her
128
behalf) to get into and, then remain, in the game.
If a candidate
runs for U.S. Senate, is outspent $17 million to $15 million but still
wins, her next thought is hardly, “oh, well I guess I don’t have to
worry about raising so much money next time because it clearly
didn’t matter.”
This leads to another important point: regardless of the actual
influence of money on election outcomes, money will continue to
matter as long as all the key players in the system act as if it matters—
and there is little doubt that they do. When current Chicago Mayor
and former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel was in
Congress and working to engineer a Democratic takeover of the
House of Representatives in 2006, he summed up the prevailing view
in a candid speech to campaign staff: “The first third of your
campaign is money, money, money. The second third is money,
129
money, money. And the last third is votes, press, and money.” It is
common knowledge that fundraising prowess or potential (or the
ability to self-finance) is a primary factor considered by party leaders
130
responsible for candidate recruitment.
Candidates’ and elected
officials’ own behavior demonstrates conclusively that they consider
amassing sufficient financial resources to be a sin qua non of a
131
successful campaign.
127

See, e.g., UP with Steve Kornacki (MSNBC television broadcast May 19, 2013)
(interview with Kim Barker), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/52109133/ns/msnbcrachel_maddow_show/t/steve-kornacki-sunday-may-th/#.UiNIqrzlxz0. (“And some
of the ads just don’t work at all. Like they don’t connect with the voters, they don’t
have any sort of impact. And the reason they don’t have any sort of impact is
because they were written to satisfy the donor, and what the donor wanted to say is I
hate this, I hate this person for doing it, and I want everybody to know it . . . they
have no influence.”).
128
See supra Part III.C.
129
Lee Drutman, Why Money Still Matters, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (Nov. 15,
2012 10:34 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/15/why-money-stillmatters/ (quoting NAFTALI BENDAVID, THE THUMPIN 157 (2008)).
130
See, e.g., Millionaire Candidates, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/millionaires.php (visited Sept. 1, 2013,
10:58 AM) (“[M]ore and more candidates are jumping into politics using their
personal fortune. . . .”).
131
See, e.g., Tracey Jan, For Freshmen in Congress, Focus is on Raising Money, THE
BOSTON GLOBE May 12, 2013 (“The newcomers were told to devote at least four
hours each day to the tedious task of raising money—so-called dialing for dollars—so
they could build a war chest and defend their seats, according to those present.
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Furthermore, the very makeup of Congress itself provides some
evidence that it helps to be wealthy (and presumably have wealthy
friends) if one wants to serve in the Senate or the “people’s House.”
The U.S. Congress is a virtual millionaire’s club, with more than 48%
132
its members having a net worth of more than $1 million.
The
133
median wealth of U.S. senators is $2.5 million. This compares with
134
a population of constituents in which just 4.3% were millionaires
135
and median household net worth was $68,828 in 2011.
Not surprisingly, there is a corresponding lack of working-class
citizens in our national legislature, as noted above and documented
136
by Duke University’s Nicholas Carnes. In addition to reporting the
numbers—just 2% of representatives came from working class
137
backgrounds over a 100-year period —Carnes finds evidence that
the class makeup of Congress influences policy outcomes. In a 2012
study of roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives, he
reports that:
Occupational differences in roll-call voting were striking.
Representatives who entered politics after careers in profitoriented professions—farm owners, businesspeople, and
other private-sector professionals—voted substantially more
conservatively than other members. Representatives from
working-class jobs, on the other hand, voted more liberally.
And representatives who last worked as politicians and
service-based professionals (the not-for-profit professions)
That’s twice as much time as party leaders expect them to dedicate to committee
hearings
and
floor
votes,
or
meetings
with
constituents.”),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/05/11/freshman-lawmakers-areintroduced-permanent-hunt-for-campaignmoney/YQMMMoqCNxGKh2h0tOIF9H/story.html.
132
Millionaire Freshman Make Congress Even Wealthier, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS Jan. 16, 2013, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/01/new-congressnew-and-more-wealth.html.
133
Id.
134
Emily Jane Fox, Number of Millionaires See a Decline in Wealth, CNN MONEY June
4,
2012,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/01/news/economy/americanmillionaires/index.htm.
135
Alfred Gottschalck, Marina Vornovytskyy & Adam Smith, Household Wealth in
the U.S.: 2000 to 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth%20Highlights%202011.pdf.
136
Nicholas Carnes, Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in
Congress Matter?, 37 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 6–7 (2012) (looking at data from 1901 to 1996
and showing that working-class people “made up between 50% and 60% of the
nation during the last hundred years but . . . constituted 2% or less of the legislators
who served in each Congress during that time.”).
137
Id. at 6.

LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/22/2013 2:20 PM

BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE

1255

and lawyers (the professional, ambiguous category) fell in
138
between.
One more piece of evidence is worth mentioning. The “political
1% of the 1%” Drutman identified is so influential that “[n]ot a
single member of the House or Senate elected last year won without
financial assistance from this group. Money from the nation’s 31,385
biggest givers found its way into the coffers of every successful
congressional candidate. And 84% of those elected in 2012 took
more money from these 1% of the 1% donors than they did from all
of their small donors (individuals who gave $200 or less)
139
combined.”
It appears that if one wishes to get elected to federal
office, it helps to raise money from wealthy donors.
D. The Vicious Cycle Complete
What emerges is a clear picture of a classic vicious cycle.
Wealthy donors capturing control of the political system leads to
economic policies that benefit the already-rich. This concentrates
140
income at the top, facilitating further political capture.
Both
political equality and economic opportunity are compromised, and a
nation that was once the international symbol of equal opportunity
regardless of station has become both less equal and less mobile
economically.
IV. HOW THE SUPREME COURT HELPED IGNITE THE VICIOUS CYCLE,
141
AND HOW A NEW JURISPRUDENCE CAN HELP REVERSE IT
A. Capitalism and Democracy
The story outlined above is, fundamentally, about the uneasy
138

Id. at 15.
Drutman, supra note 111.
140
GILENS, supra note 19, at 252 (“[R]ich Americans tend to support the
economic policies from which they have so greatly benefited. This raises the
disturbing prospect of a vicious cycle in which growing economic and political
inequality are mutually reinforcing.”).
141
Many of the ideas contained in this section have been previously published in
Adam Lioz & Liz Kennedy, Democracy at Stake: Political Equality in the Super PAC Era, 39
HUMAN RTS. MAG. 18 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications
/human_rights_magazine_home/2012_vol_39_/winter_2012__vote/democracy_at_stakepoliticalequalityinthesuperpacera.html; see also Adam Lioz,
Why Corporations Shouldn’t Play in Elections, HUFFINGTON POST Sept. 12, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-lioz
/why-corporations-shouldnt_b_283703.html. I first developed these ideas in a 2006
unpublished paper written to satisfy the writing requirements at Yale Law School.
This paper is available upon request.
139
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relationship between the representative democracy the founders
designed and the (moderated) capitalism that has evolved to
complement it. Calibrating this relationship correctly is absolutely
essential for ensuring the legitimacy of the relationships within each
system or sphere. This is in part because we hold different values
dear in each aspect of our public lives. Critically, the value of equality
is much more central to our political and constitutional tradition
than our economic order.
At the time of ratification, our Constitution and Bill of Rights
were primarily concerned with freedom, specifically with protecting
142
citizens from an unaccountable and oppressive central government.
Yet, the Declaration of Independence’s invocation that “all men are
created equal” showed that notions of basic equality (as understood
143
at the time) informed our nation’s very birth. From there, one can
view American history as a slow, arduous struggle to elevate political
equality to its rightful place on par with liberty as a fundamental
political and constitutional value.
The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments changed
the focus of the Constitution, giving a new and strident voice to
144
equality concerns.
The Nineteenth Amendment expanded the
145
The
franchise to women, affirming their equal status as citizens.
146
embraced political equality as a
one person, one vote cases
fundamental right and necessity in the United States; and the poll
147
148
149
tax,
property requirement,
and candidate filing fee
cases
confirmed that this equality was not to be denied on account of
financial resources, or lack thereof.
The Voting Rights Act,
considered by many as the crown jewel of the Civil Rights
142

See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
143
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html.
144
In his influential text We the People: Foundations, Bruce Ackerman argues that
this “constitutional moment” transformed our Constitution fundamentally. BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 211 (1991); see also AMAR, supra note 142, at
299.
145
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 946 (2002),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=2116&context=fss_papers.
146
See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
147
See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
148
See generally Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
149
See generally Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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150

Movement, sought to make the promise of political equality real by
offering federal protections against state and local efforts to restrict
151
the franchise on account of race.
This trajectory has led several noted legal and constitutional
scholars to recognize that equality “is one of the center beams of the
152
legal order;” “[p]olitical equality is the cornerstone of American
153
democracy;” “the goal of political equality is time-honored in the
154
American constitutional tradition;” and “[t]he history of American
155
democracy is a halting journey toward political equality.”
Critically, the value of equality is not found exclusively in the
Reconstruction Amendments, to be balanced or pitted against the
First Amendment, but rather is an essential part of the meaning of
the First Amendment itself. Professor Kenneth Karst borrows
language from the famous First Amendment case New York Times v.
Sullivan to make the point that “[t]he principle of equality, when
understood to mean equal liberty, is not just a peripheral support for
the freedom of expression, but rather part of the ‘central meaning of
156
the First Amendment.’”
Karst argues further that “the first
amendment demands an even greater degree of equality in the
157
electoral process than does the equal protection clause,” and
Professor David Cole claims that “the First Amendment creates a kind
158
Finally,
of equal protection guarantee for speakers and ideas.”
Professor and Judge J. Skelly Wright notes that “the ideals of political
equality and individual participation are essential to a proper
159
understanding of the first amendment.”
This scholarly view tracks well with common understanding.
150

See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Goodbye to the Crown Jewel of the Civil Rights Movement,
SLATE
June
25,
2013,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics
/jurisprudence/2013/06/supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_goodbye_to_se
ction_5.html.
151
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (struck in part by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013).
152
OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 11 (1998).
153
J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625 (1982).
154
Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, supra note 57, at 1399.
155
Burt Neuborne, Soft Landings, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 179 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 2000).
156
Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 21 (1975) (internal citation omitted).
157
Id. at 53.
158
David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 243 (1991).
159
Wright, supra note 153, at 609.
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Regardless of partisan affiliation or economic circumstance, the vast
majority of Americans agree that it is critical that we all come to the
160
political table as equals. Past restrictions on political participation
based upon wealth, property ownership, race, gender, and other
factors have given way to a nearly universal belief that representative
democracy requires all citizens to have a substantially equal voice in
making the decisions that affect their lives. Put simply, the principle
161
of “one person, one vote” is foundational and essentially universally
162
accepted in American democracy.
By contrast, equality is a much more contested value in the
163
economic sphere.
This is because most of us recognize
countervailing values such as incentives and efficiency, albeit to
varying degrees; and even when we agree on a set of goals (such as
widely shared prosperity), many have different empirical
164
understandings about how to achieve them.
Hence, our views
about how to divide the economic pie are much more likely to break
down along partisan or ideological lines. All else being equal, selfdescribed conservatives are typically comfortable with a wider income
or wealth gap than are self-described progressives. Regardless, few (if
any) prominent voices argue for complete outcome equality, or even
the types of aggressive measures that would provide pure equality of
opportunity.
These policy prescriptions, such as completely
forbidding the transfer of wealth from one generation to the next,
mandating equal (or remedial) per-pupil educational expenditures
nationwide, or even outlawing private secondary education entirely,
160

This point is apparently so self-evident that it is difficult to find polling on this
precise question; but, it is commonly asserted. See, e.g., David Callahan & J. Mijin
Cha, supra note 24, at 1.
161
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
162
The application of the principle, of course, is often a subject of vigorous
dispute. But stakeholders generally argue how to most effectively implement the
true meaning of the principle, not that the principle itself should be replaced or
lacks moral weight. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL
(citing different federal and state rules for determining equal population for
redistricting purposes), available at redistricting.lls.edu; Joshua M. Rosenberg,
Defining Population for One Person, one Vote, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 709 (2009) (discussing
whether the total population or number of voters in a jurisdiction should be
equalized).
163
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Upside of Income Inequality, THE
AMERICAN
(May / June
2007),
available
at
http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-june-magazine-contents/the-upsideof-income-inequality.
164
Well-meaning economists, for example, disagree about the impact on
economic growth and income distribution of tax cuts, government spending,
monetary policy, and more.
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remain largely outside the scope of mainstream American political
165
discourse.
In sum, our twin commitments to democracy and capitalism
leave most Americans with the general sense that every citizen has an
equal right to participate in political life, but not necessarily the right
to possess an equal number of dollars or amount of property. The
challenge occurs because although we hold different principles dear
in these two spheres, they are not completely independent; inevitably
they must interact. Without proper protections, those who are
successful (or simply lucky) in the economic sphere can translate
166
their economic might directly into political power.
Inequalities in
the economic sphere that are perhaps legitimate become
unwarranted disparities in the political sphere. Ultimately, in order
to protect the integrity of the values we hold dear and the legitimacy
of the relationships that serve (or undermine) these values in each
sphere, democracy must write the rules for capitalism, not the other
way around.
In addition to being guided by different principles, the political
and economic arenas serve fundamentally different purposes.
Unfettered market capitalism responds to only one value: more. The
market is best at producing more goods, but not necessarily effective
at producing human happiness. This is because human happiness is
based not just on material possessions, but also on countervailing
167
values such as community, reciprocity, ecology, etc.
The political
arena is the proper place to assert these countervailing values, but the
capture of the political arena by economic interests threatens to leave
these values chronically underserved.
We often see evidence of this with the capture of government
agencies by the industries they regulate. State departments of
environmental protection have been infamous in their pliancy
165

That some of these measures may be unconstitutional is beside the point. If
pure economic equality were a bedrock American value, we would expect to see
these measures at least command some space within the public debate over
economic policy.
166
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 86, at 1162 (“In market societies where wealth is
unevenly distributed yet crucial to the processes of election and governance, the
inegalitarian logic of the economy undermines the egalitarian logic of one person,
one vote democracy.”).
167
In fact, at least one study suggests that beyond a threshold that provides for
security and basic needs, wealth is not strongly correlated with happiness. See Daniel
Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but not
Emotional Well-Being , PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. (Aug. 4,
2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/107/38/16489.
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168

towards polluters; the Securities and Exchange Commission has
169
been run by Wall Street insiders; the Food and Drug Administration
has allowed questionable drugs into the marketplace under pressure
170
from the pharmaceutical industry; and the Minerals Management
Service was reorganized after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
171
Several factors contribute
exposed its cozy ties to the oil industry.
to this “regulatory capture,” including the revolving door of
172
employment in industry and the agencies that regulate them,
173
intense industry lobbying, and the desire of top-level political
appointees to please executives in these industries who are
responsible for a significant proportion of their bosses’ campaign
174
cash through individual and PAC contributions.
A lack of prophylactic controls that prevent economic relations
from shaping political institutions also threatens our ability to make
sound decisions as a society. When ideas gain currency not from
their inherent appeal, but due to the brute force with which they are
175
advocated, the marketplace of ideas is distorted.
Our collective
168

See, e.g., Lee Fang, New ALEC Documents Show Regulatory Capture in Action, THE
NATION Dec. 19, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/blog/171852/new-alecdocuments-show-regulatory-capture-action#axzz2deycqgSx.
169
See, e.g., Dina ElBoghdady, Watchdog Report Raises Concerns about SEC’s Revolving
Door, WASH. POST Feb. 11, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0211/business/37034389_1_clients-pogo-report-sec-job.
170
See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, FDA Still Too Chummy with Pharmaceutical Industry, Critics
SEATTLE
TIMES
Nov.
22,
2007,
Say,
THE
http://seattletimes.com/html/health/2004029053_fenphen22m.html.
171
Juliet Eilperin & Scott Higham, How the Minerals Management Services’
Partnership with Industry Led to Failure, WASH. POST Aug. 24, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406754.html?sid=ST2010082404823.
172
More than 70% of the lobbyists employed by the securities and investment
industry have previously worked in government according to the Center for
Responsive Politics.
Revolving Door: Top Industries, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
173
The pharmaceutical and health products industry spent $236 million on
lobbying in 2012 according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
Pharmaceuticals/Health
Products,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/01/lobbying-expenditures-slump-in2011.html(last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
174
Individuals and PACs associated with the finance, insurance, and real estate
industries contributed $664 million to federal campaigns in the 2012 cycle according
to the Center for Responsive Politics.
Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
175
Spending money to promote an idea can both help develop the best
arguments in favor of the idea and help amplify the idea such that people are
exposed to it again and again in various forms. By “brute force” I mostly mean the
latter, although the concept can apply to the former as well.
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choices are unfairly, and inefficiently, skewed. Professor David Cole
echoes this basic point:
Free market capitalism threatens the free marketplace of
ideas by giving certain voices inordinate influence, not
because of the power of their ideas, but because of the
volume they can generate for their voices with dollars
earned through commercial activities. Because even “free
speech” costs money, those who succeed in the economic
marketplace are able to purchase far more speech
opportunities than those who do not. Absent government
intervention of some kind, the marketplace of ideas, and in
turn the election of our representatives, threatens to go to
the highest bidder. The threat posed by concentrated
wealth is not merely the aberration of a bribed official, but
the structural threat of a monopolized marketplace of
176
ideas.
Finally, and most importantly, the bleeding of economic logic
into political space threatens the very legitimacy of democratic
decision-making, which, in turn, threatens the moral legitimacy of
economic relations—completing a vicious cycle that echoes the one
described above.
Professor Edward B. Foley points out that all major modern
theories of distributive justice (egalitarianism, libertarianism,
utilitarianism, etc.) accept what he calls the “principal of intrinsic
equality,” the notion that “the interests of all citizens must count
177
equally for the purposes of distributive justice.” Loosely translated,
this means that Abby’s “utils” (or units of value) cannot be worth
more than Bob’s. If each have five “utils,” society as a whole will not
be made better off by giving Abby one of Bob’s “utils” because she is
in some way inherently more valuable than he is (as, for example, a
monarch was no doubt once thought to be). Because everything
beyond this one basic principle is in legitimate dispute, it is critical
that society adopts a collective decision-making procedure that is
consistent with this core principle, yet does not systemically replicate
any particular distribution of resources that happens to represent the
status quo. Ultimately, Foley writes, “the very indeterminacy of
distributive justice requires the fairness of the existing distribution of
wealth to be determined by an electoral process that is structurally
immunized from any distorting effects caused by the existing
176

Cole, supra note 158, at 237.
Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994).
177
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178

distribution.”
Some scholars assert that allowing the wealthy to amplify their
speech as much as will satisfy their need to feel heard is necessary to
serve core First Amendment values by respecting speaker
179
autonomy.
But, others, such as Julian Eule, Owen Fiss, and Cass
Sunstein, argue that the type of undue influence over public
discourse facilitated by unchecked transference of economic wealth
into the political sphere represents a fundamental threat to citizen
autonomy. Sunstein notes that “[t]he notion of autonomy should
refer . . . to decisions reached with a full and vivid awareness of
available opportunities, with reference to all relevant information,
and without illegitimate or excessive constraints on the process of
preference formation” and that individual attitudes are best
“regarded as nonautonomous insofar as they are reflexively adaptive
180
to unjust background conditions.”
Unless we are prepared to structure a wholly egalitarian
economy, we cannot allow a particular current economic distribution
to set the terms for our political deliberations. To safeguard the
legitimacy of both our democracy and the particular brand of
moderated capitalism we currently employ, political equality must be
our north star—the guiding principle around which we structure our
society.
B. Wealth and Politics
This discussion of the relationship between capitalism and
democracy shows clearly why for-profit corporations should not be
permitted to spend treasury funds on electoral activities. As
economic actors chartered by the people to produce wealth, their
political participation necessarily contributes to the vicious cycle
181
described above.
The fact that these artificial entities enjoy state178

Id. at 1230.
Robert Post, Meiklejohns Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1129–30 (1993). Note that Post applies this
notion only to the sphere of public discourse, which he distinguishes from the
narrower sphere of electoral decision-making. Robert Post, Dean and Sol & Lillian
Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Representative Democracy: The
Constitutional Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES (May 1-3, 2013).
180
Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 11, 21 (1991).
181
There are other important reasons why corporate political speech is different
in character than that of natural persons. Notably, one would hope that when
engaging in political speech, citizens of a polity would consider and advocate what
they perceive to be in the public interest, not just what is in their narrow pecuniary
179
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conferred advantages that assist in the aggregation of wealth
182
exacerbates the problem.
But, this logic can also apply to private personal wealth.
Consider a law-firm partner or small-business owner who makes
millions of dollars through a private partnership, a hedge-fund
manager who earns billions in management fees that ultimately
accrue to his private bank account, or a corporate executive who
earns millions in salary and benefits and then still millions more by
selling shares of the corporation’s stock granted as part of her
compensation package. If these individuals spend large amounts of
their private capital to influence public decisions in our democracy,
does this somehow cease to threaten our core democratic values or
no longer contribute to the vicious cycle outlined above simply
because they spend as individuals rather than through the corporate
form?
Regardless of the form they take, as Sunstein points out, “there is
no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be translated into
disparities in political power.
A well-functioning democracy
distinguishes between market processes of purchase and sale on the
one hand and political processes of voting and reason-giving on the
183
other.”
Simply put, to ensure the legitimacy of both our political and
economic relations, democracy must write the rules for capitalism,
not the other way around. Robust rules regulating the use of money
in politics are the best means we have to accomplish this end—the
best protection against the direct translation of economic might into
political power. These rules should certainly prohibit corporations
from spending treasury funds to influence elections. They should
also prevent millionaires and billionaires from drowning out the
voices of non-wealthy citizens by spending excessive sums to support
their favored candidates, or attempting to buy elected office outright
for themselves. And, they should ensure that a tiny minority of

interest. Publicly traded for-profit corporations, on the other hand, are bound by
fiduciary duty to shareholders to consider only the profit motive when taking and
advocating public positions. Many scholars also argue persuasively that for-profit
corporations lack free speech and other constitutional rights that would grant them
entry into the domain of public discourse. This discussion is largely beyond the
scope of this article, but for a full discussion see JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS
ARE NOT PEOPLE: WHY THEY HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN YOU DO AND WHAT YOU CAN DO
ABOUT IT (2012).
182
See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
183
Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, supra note 57, at 1390.
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wealthy donors cannot determine who runs for office by making
contributions to campaigns that are significantly larger than those
average-earning citizens can afford to make.
C. The Role of the Supreme Court
1. The People In the Lead
The American people have long been concerned with the
troubling relationship between economic might and political power.
The cornerstone reforms of the Progressive Era were attempts to
right the balance between politics and economics, a balance that had
been badly skewed by the emergence of the great trusts. Theodore
Roosevelt asserted in 1910 that “[t]he citizens of the United States
must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they
184
themselves have called into being,”
another way of saying that
democracy must write the rules for capitalism. He continued by
noting that “[t]here can be no effective control of corporations while
185
their political activity remains.”
The Progressive Era produced important reforms intended to
186
curb the political power of aggregated wealth.
But the battle to
empower ordinary citizens over wealthy interests did not end there.
In the 1970s, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act,
187
then strengthened it in response to the Watergate scandal.
In
recent decades numerous states and localities have passed laws to
curb the influence of big money on our democracy and raise the
188
voices of non-wealthy citizens—from strict contribution limits and
189
190
caps on candidate spending to public financing programs and
bans on corporate spending on candidate and ballot initiative
191
campaigns.
Several of these programs were passed by the people
184

Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Osawatomie, Kansas: The New Nationalism
(Aug. 31, 1910), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document
/new-nationalism-speech/.
185
Id.
186
The Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
187
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat.
3 (1972).
188
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (2009), as adjusted by MONT. ADMIN. R. 44.10.338
(2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (2005).
189
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a (2005).
190
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16–940 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9700, et seq. (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A §§ 1121-28 (2011); VT. STAT.
ANN., tit. 17 §§ 2803, 2811, 2821–23, 2831–32, 2851–56 (2011).
191
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 3(4), 6(2); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
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192

directly through ballot initiatives.
And, support among the public
193
for strict campaign finance laws public remains sky-high.
2. The Supreme Court Drags Behind
Unfortunately, in the battle to empower the vast majority of
ordinary citizens over a tiny minority of wealthy donors, advocates
have been severely confined by the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence; unable to mount a full-throated defense of laws that
can effectively constrain the dominance of wealth in politics. This is
because for decades, rather than carefully considering both core
American values of liberty and equality and grappling directly with
the challenges outlined above, the Supreme Court has embraced a
simplistic and reflexively individualistic and libertarian view of the
Constitution. The justices have failed to recognize our collective
interest in promoting political equality as a legitimate and compelling
governmental interest and, more recently, even declared that these
194
efforts are specifically forbidden by the First Amendment.
And,
they have failed to give adequate consideration to any number of
other rationales that can promote effective representation by
195
safeguarding a government of, by, and for the people.
Rather, the Supreme Court has recognized only one
governmental interest weighty enough to limit campaign money, and
then narrowed the scope of that one interest over the years. This has
been anti-regulatory justices’ primary mechanism for deeming
forbidden many reasonable restrictions on money in politics. And, it
has meant that as reform advocates have approached the proverbial
bench to defend democratically-enacted campaign finance laws, they
have then been forced to leave many of their very best arguments
behind.
196
In the seminal 1976 campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo, the
169.254(1) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2003); 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. P.S. § 3253(a) (West 2006).
192
See, e.g., Arizona Clean Elections, Proposition 200 (1998); Maine Campaign
Finance Initiative, Question 3 (1996).
193
Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Overwhelming, Bi-Partisan Opposition to
Corporate Political Spending And Support for Achievable Reforms, DEMOS Oct. 25, 2012,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/CitizensActuallyUnited_Cor
poratePoliticalSpending.pdf.
194
See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011).
195
Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm.
196
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court addressed post-Watergate amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA), which included limits on contributions to
candidates for federal office, limits on campaign spending by these
candidates, and limits on “independent” spending by individuals or
197
entities supporting or opposing a specific candidate.
The Court
held that spending money on politics was a form of direct speech and
therefore any restrictions on such spending were subject to strict
scrutiny; and that making financial contributions to candidates or
causes is a form of attenuated speech, still deserving of First
Amendment protections, but subject to a slightly lower standard of
198
scrutiny.
Ultimately, the Court upheld limits on contributions to
candidates and political action committees and struck down limits on
direct expenditures both by candidates and other persons or
199
groups.
But, most relevant for the purposes of this Article, the Buckley
Court recognized only one government interest in limiting campaign
money that it deemed sufficiently weighty to balance against what it
saw as an important restriction of liberty: preventing corruption or its
200
appearance.
While not completely clear, the Court’s definition of
corruption appeared to be fairly narrow, focusing on the quid pro
201
quo exchange of money for votes or other official action. Further,
197

The Federal Election Campaign Act 1974 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263, amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3.
198
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19–20 (“The expenditure limitations contained in the Act
represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and
diversity of political speech. . . . By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for
political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”).
199
The Buckley Court’s per curium opinion upheld contribution limits and public
financing but struck limits on candidate spending and independent expenditures.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143–44.
200
The government asserted two other interests—equalizing political voice and
maintaining an accessible process in the face of increasing campaign costs. The
Court did not assess these in the context of contribution limits. Buckley, 424 U.S. at
26 (“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose to limit the actuality
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions
in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution
limitation.”). But, it considered and rejected both interests in the context of
expenditure limits. Id. at 48–50 (see infra text accompanying note 202); Id. at 54
(“The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates
competing for elective office . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify the provision’s
infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.”).
201
Id. at 26–27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
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the Buckley Court specifically rejected a compelling interest in
promoting political equality by leveling the playing field between
wealthy donors and average citizens. In what may be the single most
damaging sentence in the entire canon of campaign finance law, the
Buckley Court wrote that “the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some . . . in order to enhance the relative voice of
202
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”
While wrongheaded in its rejection of an equality interest,
Buckley nevertheless left the door open to other rationales beyond
quid pro quo corruption, and in the ensuing years the justices
grappled with various possibilities. The Court recognized what is
arguably a species of the equality argument in a case called Austin v.
203
Michigan Chamber of Commerce; entertained an expansive, somewhat
204
systemic view of corruption in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC; and
affirmed this expansive view in McConnell v. Federal Election
205
Commission.
In a concurring opinion in Nixon, Justice Stevens
articulated his view that “[m]oney is property; it is not speech,”
206
urging a reexamination of Buckley’s foundational assumptions.
But, the Roberts Court has put a decisive end to any remnant
207
flexibility. First in 2006’s Randall v. Sorrell, then in Davis v. Federal
208
Election Commission, and culminating in Citizens United v. Federal
209
Election Commission, the Court majority again explicitly rejected
rationales beyond corruption (overturning Austin) and significantly
narrowed the scope of the anti-corruption interest, asserting that
210
“ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”
The Court’s exclusive reliance on corruption is troubling for two
key reasons. First, it is wholly inadequate to address the profound
interests at stake in regulating the role of money in politics because it
system of representative democracy is undermined.”).
202
Id. at 48–49.
203
494 U.S. 652, 659–61 (1990).
204
528 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2000).
205
540 U.S. 93, 143–54 (2003).
206
528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring). My views of the relationship between
money and speech are somewhat beyond the scope of this article; but I do not
subscribe to the categorical view that money should always be conceived of as
property with no speech element.
207
548 U.S. 230 (2006).
208
554 U.S. 724 (2008).
209
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
210
Id. at 360 (overturning McConnell in part). The post-Citizens United case Ariz.
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett singled out the desire to level the
playing field as being an impermissible government interest. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
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completely misses the point of the vicious cycle story outlined above,
and in so doing, actually mis-defines the problem of money in
politics. Second, it is not intellectually defensible because when
closely scrutinized, concerns about quid pro quo corruption (the type
that the Court currently recognizes as constitutionally momentous)
break down into a deeper concern about inequality.
The reality is that fighting corruption and its appearance is only
one of the interests at stake in efforts to, as Justice Breyer has written,
“democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the
211
electoral process” —and not even the most important one.
Addressing the role of money in politics is not simply about good or
clean governance. Rather, it is about shifting fundamental power
dynamics in American society to facilitate meaningful representation
for all citizens. The vicious cycle outlined in this Article is
fundamentally about voice and power. Promoting political equality is
a key motivation behind the drive to curb the influence of wealthy
donors and empower ordinary citizens.
Judge Guido Calabresi addressed this point in an important
2005 opinion:
It seems to me that there are two principal values at play in
the campaign finance debate. One is the desire to let
individuals express the intensity of their political feelings,
and to do so in a very particular way—that is, through
money in the form of either campaign expenditures or
contributions. . . .
The other value is the deeply felt desire not to have the
wealthy be able to influence elections more than the poor.
This value, however, has two distinct aspects. The first is the
generalized egalitarian desire not to advantage one group
in society over another. The second—which is inextricably
linked to the “intensity of expression” value and hence
partakes of its First Amendment attributes—is that, given
the unequal distribution of wealth, money does not
measure intensity of desire equally for rich and poor. In
other words, and crucially, a large contribution by a person
of great means may influence an election enormously, and
yet may represent a far lesser intensity of desire than a
pittance given by a poor person. . . .
The notion that intensity of desire is not well-measured by
money in a society where money is not equally distributed
211

STEPHEN BREYER,
CONSTITUTION 47 (2005).
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has been, since Buckley, the huge elephant—and donkey—
in the living room in all discussions of campaign finance
reform. Buckley, by fiat, declared the state’s explicit
recognition and amelioration of wealth distribution
problems in the electoral marketplace to be an
insufficiently compelling interest to pass constitutional
muster. And yet, I submit, it remains at least implicitly
212
behind much campaign finance reform legislation.
The anti-corruption rationale, as interpreted by the Court, has
always been inadequate to address this challenge. Sheldon and
Miriam Adelson gave nearly $92 million to Super PACs created in the
213
wake of Citizens United. But, since Buckley, the Adelsons would have
been able to spend that money directly to support the candidates of
their choice. Modern candidates occasionally spend tens of millions
214
of dollars of their own money attempting to win public office. And,
corporations and wealthy donors have long been permitted to spend
215
unlimited sums to support or oppose ballot initiatives. All of these
situations are troubling and violate the principle of one person, one
vote; none involves quid pro quo corruption.
3. Quid Pro Quo Corruption is an Equality Concern
Each legislator in a representative democracy embodies an
inherent tension. Is her role to lead the people or to follow? Is she
elected as a trustee, sent to the capitol to exercise her own
independent and considered judgment when faced with moral and
political issues? Or, is she merely a delegate, sent to voice the will of
her constituents and vote according to her understanding of their
216
desires?
212

Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 160–62 (2d. Cir. 2005) (internal citations
omitted).
213
Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 10. As noted above, this may not be evidence
of any particularly intense desire for political participation since this figure
represents a very small percentage of the Adelsons’ net worth—the equivalent of an
average-earning family contributing less than $300.
214
See, e.g., Jennifer Lin & Tom Torcol, Corzine’s Wealth Paving Senate Campaign:
The New Jersey Democrat Has Risen from Obscurity, Spending Prodigiously: $15 for Every
Dollar
By
Florio,
THE
PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER
May
25,
2000,
http://articles.philly.com/2000-05-25/news/25618243_1_jon-s-corzine-senate-racesenate-candidate.
215
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
216
Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
111, 120–21. For an illuminating historical discussion of the tensions around
representation, see also Robert Post, Representative Democracy: The Constitutional Theory
of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 179.
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If one believes in a pure trustee model, then any attempt to
influence a legislator’s vote—including a promised or actual
campaign contribution—is an unwelcome distortion. As Professor
David Strauss writes:
On one view of the political process, most decisions made
by our system are like the decisions of judges. This view
holds that there is a comprehensive conception of the
public interest. That is, decisions in general are to be made
by consulting the public interest, and we can determine
what the public interest is by engaging in some form of
217
normative reasoning.
All indications, however, are that few citizens or academics hold
to this strict view. And, in fact, Strauss continues by lamenting that
218
this approach “seems to leave no room for elections.” Most people
in reality seem to feel there is nothing inherently wrong with
attempting to influence legislators’ votes on public issues. This
happens all the time when people call or write their legislators, or
stage protests and rallies. Further, without realizing it, we embrace
the corresponding belief that there is nothing inherently sinister
about quid pro quo arrangements in representative democracy. In
219
fact this type of give-and-take lies at the heart of democratic politics.
In a process known as “logrolling,” legislators trade favors all of
the time—that is, “you vote for my pet project and I’ll vote for yours,”
or “you agree to fight the closing of the army base in my district and
I’ll vote for you for party whip.” This is in large part how legislative
business is conducted in Washington, D.C. and in state capitols and
city halls throughout the United States.
Citizens and interest groups regularly engage in explicit and
implicit quid pro quos with legislators as well—for votes. AARP is an
extremely powerful organization because it presumptively
220
“represents” millions of older (and regular) voters.
These are
voters who are willing to collectively make demands on politicians
217

David Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 141, 147.
218
Id. at 147.
219
For a similar version of the forthcoming argument, see Thomas Cmar, Toward
a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of Incentives for Small Political Contributions,
U.S.
PIRG
EDUCATION
FUND
(2004),
at
37,
available
at
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports
/Toward_A_Small_Donor_Democracy_USPIRG.pdf.
220
According to its website, AARP has more than 37 million members. Who We
Are, AARP.ORG, http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/?intcmp=FTR-LINKS (last visited
Sept. 1, 2013).
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precisely by implying that those who turn a deaf ear risk paying the
price on Election Day. The League of Conservation Voters (LCV)
puts out a scorecard ranking candidates according to their
221
environmental records
and endorses candidates—explicitly
announcing to its membership and other concerned members of the
public that they should vote for or against a candidate because of her
222
votes on environmental issues. LCV lobbyists aggressively pursue a
legislative agenda in Washington. Although explicitly threatening
politicians is rarely good lobbying strategy, on major priorities such as
drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or supporting the
Keystone Pipeline, it is perfectly clear to politicians that the
organization’s endorsement is staked on their positions. The same is
true of countless membership-based organizations across the country.
None of this activity is considered suspect in a democracy, and
our acceptance of bald attempts to influence legislators indicates that
most of us accept the delegate model at least to a significant extent.
So, why is the Supreme Court so concerned about financial quid pro
quo arrangements? After all, this is not money that goes directly into
politicians’ pockets; bribery laws outlaw such explicit personal gain.
Why is it perfectly acceptable for a citizen or a group of citizens to
explicitly promise a politician their vote—or implicitly promise
thousands or millions of votes—if she votes the “right” way on a
favorite issue, but inherently problematic to promise a financial
contribution to the same politician’s campaign for the exact same
223
vote?
The answer to this question is almost certainly that what
concerns us about the latter situation is not the quid pro quo
arrangement at all, but a vague and unarticulated notion of equality.
We are not bothered by citizens bargaining with their votes because
224
everyone isat least in theory accorded a vote on an equal basis,
and thus everyone enjoys equal bargaining power. This is not so with
financial bargaining power. It violates our basic sense of fairness to
221

Nat’l
Envtl.
Scorecard,
LEAGUE
OF
CONSERVATION
VOTERS,
http://scorecard.lcv.org/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
222
2012
Endorsements,
LEAGUE
OF
CONSERVATION
VOTERS,
http://www.lcv.org/elections/endorsements/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
223
Cain, supra note 216, at 116 (“According to some reformers, an official who
takes a public action in exchange for contributions is guilty of bribery, but one who
exchanges public actions for votes is not. This makes no sense. The personal benefit
in both cases is holding office: money and votes are used to win elections, and as
between the two, votes are more crucial than money.”).
224
Disparities in actual voting power, of course, persist between the affluent and
the poor, whites and communities of color, older Americans and youth, etc.
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bargain for legislative success with money because that game is not
played on a level playing field due to unequal wealth distribution. As
Strauss writes, “[o]ne obvious problem with allowing candidates to be
‘bought’ is that people with more wealth are, other things equal, in a
better position to buy them. Corruption of this kind, therefore,
225
presents problems of inequality.”
Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein, in a response to Strauss and
Bruce Cain, works to rehabilitate the conceptual distinction between
226
corruption and equality. To illustrate that corruption concerns are
truly about inequality, Strauss constructs a thought experiment in
which everyone has an equal ability to bribe politicians with
227
campaign contributions. Lowenstein counters with an experiment
of his own, in which a wealthy donor can give a $100,000 contribution
to either a politician who supports the donor’s views or to a politician
228
who will change his views for the donor’s money.
The reader is
assumed to view the former as a legitimate transaction, but consider
the latter a horrifying example of money “corrupting” a politician.
Lowenstein misses the fundamental point that it is this donor’s
ability (financial, legal, etc.) to provide a contribution much larger
than most people could afford which is the core of the problem, not
the effect (or lack thereof) of the contribution on the person to
whom she chooses to contribute. Regardless of the influence on the
recipient, this large contribution affords the donor an outsized
influence on the political process—influence that is not
representative of the public will. In addition, it is only the fact that
this donor is contributing substantially more than her fellow citizens
that raises the prospect of undue influence. After all, if everyone had
an equal ability to contribute $100,000, her contribution would not
buy her much and there would be no problem either way.
Lowenstein also realizes that he must defend the distinction
between “bribing” politicians with campaign contributions and with
votes. He offers no principled way to make this distinction, however,
resting his case solely on the fact that “prevailing social norms
unambiguously condemn the practice” of trading campaign money
225

Strauss, supra note 217, at 143; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 679 (1997) (“Thus, properly understood,
the ‘corruption’ argument is really a variant on the problem of political equality:
unequal outlays of political money create inequality in political representation.”).
226
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on
Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163.
227
Strauss, supra note 217, at 143–44.
228
Lowenstein, supra note 226, at 168–73.
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229

for legislative outcomes.
Lowenstein posits, “[a]re there good
reasons for disapproving and seeking to change the existent norm
that regards the bartering of campaign contributions for legislative
230
votes as corrupt? I think not.”
In our current system, characterized by substantial economic
inequality and legal contributions far larger than most Americans can
afford to make, suspending this taboo would certainly make matters
worse. But, this way of thinking obscures the most important reason
we care about the influence of money on politics, and there is real
harm done by incorrectly defining the problem and hence distracting
Americans—from judges to legislators to reform advocates—from
true solutions.
Even if quid pro quo corruption were an
independently legitimate concern, focusing on its effects proceeds
from a flawed conception of the true impact of money on the
American political process. As noted above, focusing on the effect of
money on politicians misses the forest for the trees. It is much more
helpful to consider the impact of money on elections—principally on
231
who runs for political office in the U.S. and who wins elections.
This is true in large part because one could solve the corruption
problem entirely (producing “clean” government in which every
legislator votes her conscience) without substantially addressing
concerns about voice, power, and political equality, whereas the
232
reverse is not true.
4. Money Buys Elections More Often Than it Buys
Politicians
While politicians may at times alter their votes or priorities in
response to particular contributions, most politicians are probably
233
not “corrupt” in this way most of the time.
Even the most cynical
229

Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
231
I have elaborated this point much more fully and forcefully in several reports
for the U.S. PIRG Education Fund. See generally Adam Lioz, The Role of Money in the
PIRG
EDUC.
FUND,
(2003),
2002
Congressional
Elections,
U.S.
http://uspirgorg.live.pubintnetdev.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Role_of_Money_2002_USPIRG.pdf; Dana Mason &
Adam Lioz, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington, (2005),
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Look_Whos_Not_Coming_To_Was
hington_USPIRG.pdf.).
232
This is both because of the theoretical discussion above and because policies
(such as spending limits and low contribution limits) that promote political equality
also effectively minimize demand or opportunities for quid pro quo corruption.
233
Various studies have attempted to connect financial contributions with votes,
230
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critics of the American legislative process would concede that the
majority of legislation is likely produced by politicians pursuing
policies that at minimum are not in conflict with their own
convictions—and often are critical expressions of these convictions.
To the extent that votes are being shifted or (more likely) issues are
being elevated or put on the back burner because of the role of
money, this is more often because of legislators’ general calculations
about how such actions will affect their ability to raise funds than
because of a specific quid pro quo transaction.
The more deeply systemic account of the role of money in
234
politics I have articulated above stresses that the most important
impact of money is deciding who gets into positions of power and
authority in the first place. If special interests or wealthy individuals
can ensure that their friends, associates, colleagues, or neighbors are
elected to Congress, there will be comparatively little need to bribe
them once in office. After all, these are people who share their
values, grew up in the same neighborhoods, and occupy the same
socioeconomic strata.
When they honestly pursue policy in
accordance with their own convictions, they will be serving the
interests of those who helped elect them.
The relationship between former President George W. Bush and
large oil companies provides an easy example of the distinction
between focusing on the impact of money on politicians versus
elections. What is the proper relationship between the following
three facts? A) Individuals associated with the oil and gas industry
contributed more than $2 million to then-Governor Bush’s 2000
presidential election campaign, and only $145,000 to his opponent Al
235
Gore; B) President Bush won the primary and the general elections;
and C) As president, Mr. Bush moved aggressively to attempt to drill
236
for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
but most are inconclusive due to difficulties in separating correlation and causation.
Sure, candidates who receive large contributions from special interests tend to vote
their way; but did they vote that way because they received the contribution, or did
they receive the contribution because they were likely to vote that way? In his Yale
speech, Senator Chis Murphy noted “[t]here really are very few quid pro quos.”
Chris Murphy, supra note 90.
234
See supra Part III.C
235
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries
/recips.php?ind=E01&cycle=2000&recipdetail=P&mem=N&sortorder=U (last visited
Oct. 11, 2013).
236
Justin Blum, 51-49 Senate Vote Backs Arctic Oil Drilling: Longtime Bush Goal for
Alaskan Wildlife Refuge Closer to Reality, WASH. POST (March 17, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40670-2005Mar16.html
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Some would say that the oil industry “bought off” President
Bush, inducing him to push their priorities with large campaign
contributions. It’s likely, however, that most observers would see this
explanation as misunderstanding the causal relationship. President
Bush has a background in the oil industry and probably wanted to
drill in the Arctic before he received a dime of oil money. The more
likely impact of industry-associated contributions was to help him get
elected. This put him in a position of power, enabling him to pursue
the pro-oil agenda he genuinely favored prior to election. Bolstering
this explanation is the noticeable spike in contributions by companies
or individuals associated with the oil and gas industry in 2000. The
$34 million the industry put into the federal political process in 2000
was 57% more than its giving in 1998, 38% more than it gave the next
cycle, and 34% more than affiliated contributors put into the next
237
presidential cycle in 2004.
It appears that the industry saw an
opportunity to help put one of its own in the White House and
238
stepped up its contributions accordingly.
The increasing phenomenon of wealthy, self-financing
candidates provides another illustration of how the concept of
corruption fails to capture our true concerns about the role of money
in politics. Self-financed candidates often run on the notion that
they are impossible to “corrupt” and not “beholden” to special
interests or other donors. While this is likely true, many Americans
nonetheless feel uneasy about the tens of millions of dollars spent by
former U.S. Senator Jon Corzine or current New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg to win their respective seats. These expenditures
may not be corrupting, yet they are still profoundly undemocratic,
sending the message to ordinary Americans that public offices are on
the auction block and non-wealthy citizens need not apply.
Finally, the distinction we make between campaign
contributions on the one hand and personal gifts on the other
illustrates that values beyond corruption are at play. According to
House and Senate rules, members of Congress are generally
239
prohibited from accepting any gift valued at or above $50.
Do we
237

Oil & Gas, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org
/industries/indus.asp?Ind=E01 (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
238
Since George Bush and Al Gore both accepted public funds for the 2000
general election, oil and gas interests were not permitted to give more money
directly to Bush. They could, however, help Bush’s chances by giving more money to
Republicans generally. In 2000, 78% of oil and gas affiliated contributions went to
Republicans. See supra note 70.
239
Gift
Rules
for
Congress,
PUBLIC
CITIZEN
July
25,
2011,
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really believe that a $51 gift is more corrupting than a $10,400
campaign contribution from a married couple over an election
240
Or, is it more likely that we set the gift threshold so
cycle?
comparably low because we do not want wealthy individuals or
interests to have an advantage over regular citizens who cannot afford
to take a member of Congress out to a fancy meal or to a sporting
event in order to gain access to her valuable time? The low gift
threshold seems to be motivated more by a desire for equality—for
keeping Americans on the same footing with respect to their access to
their representatives—than by the concern that $60 meals or $75
gold paper weights will cause a member of Congress to change her
vote.
5. Wrong Problem, False Solutions
The main point is that, even if we are able to eliminate all
financial quid pro quo “corruption” from the electoral process,
money would still exercise tremendous influence on elections and
hence policy outcomes. Further, mis-defining the problem as being
exclusively about this narrow concern hinders our ability to
ameliorate the deeper pernicious impact of large contributions on
241
our democracy.
Articulating the wrong problem can lead to false
solutions. The best example of a false campaign finance solution on
point here is the ingenious but flawed concept of anonymous
242
contributions, or the “secret donation booth.”
This idea quite
cleverly addresses the problem of money corrupting politicians
(because a candidate would not know who has contributed to her
campaign), but does nothing to prevent wealthy donors from
exerting disproportionate influence over which candidates are able
to mount successful campaigns (unless accompanied by strict
contribution limits).
The above discussion details the limitations of basing campaign
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Gift-Rules-for-Congress.pdf.
240
The current contribution limit to candidate committees is $2,600 per person
per election. Contribution Limits for 2013-2014, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1314.pdf.
241
See Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F. 3d 159, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied,
382 F.3d 91 (“Efforts to tailor all campaign finance reform to corruption—the one
state interest heretofore recognized by the Supreme Court as sufficiently compelling
to justify spending restrictions of any sort—surely have constrained possibilities for
creative proposals that may not fit comfortably into the proffered box.”) (internal
citations omitted).
242
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 6 (2002).
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finance jurisprudence entirely (or even mostly) on the corruption
rationale. In the past few years, the Roberts Court has taken these
limitations to their (somewhat) logical extreme. In 2006, the Court
struck Vermont’s $200 contribution limits, which clearly served to
democratize the role of money but which were difficult to defend as
243
solely an anti-corruption measure. Citizens United, decided in 2010,
permitted corporate independent expenditures and opened the door
to Super PACs because the Court determined that so-called
independent spending presents no risk of corruption as a matter of
244
law.
In 2011, the Court struck Arizona’s trigger matching system
intended to enable publicly financed candidates to respond to
onslaughts of spending by big money opponents or outside groups,
specifically holding that the matching funds were unconstitutional
because they were intended to level the playing field and not to fight
245
corruption.
6. A Way Out of the Wilderness
Prior to Citizens United, some reformers believed that we could
justify most, if not all, necessary reform measures under a broadlyconceived anti-corruption rationale—even if much of the public
support behind such policies was based upon a desire to level the
playing field and prevent large donors from drowning out the voices
246
of non-wealthy citizens. This is plainly no longer the case. As noted
above, the corruption interest was always inadequate, and the Roberts
Court has made it almost completely unavailing.
And, matters could soon get worse. In February 2013, the Court
announced that it will entertain an attack on limits on the total
amount of money that any individual can contribute to all federal
247
candidates, parties, and PACs.
This could lead to more than $1
billion in additional direct campaign contributions from a small
number of elite donors through the 2020 election cycle, increasing
248
their power at the expense of small donors and ordinary citizens.
243

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
245
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–
26 (2011).
246
In making this assertion, I am not including some of the newer corruptionbased rationales that have been proffered in recent years, and which I cite to below.
See infra note 251.
247
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C.
2012), prob. juris. noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013).
248
Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, McCutcheon Money: The Projected Impact of Striking
244
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These “aggregate contribution limits” can be defended under the
corruption regime as prophylactic measures to prevent large-dollar
solicitations by officeholders and party officials that raise the threat of
quid pro quo corruption and avoid circumvention of other limits on
direct contributions. But, they could also be defended (and perhaps
more compellingly) as basic limitations on the disproportionate
influence of a few wealthy donors on who runs for office and who
wins elections, had the Court not closed this door.
The Supreme Court’s current campaign finance jurisprudence
has placed out-of-bounds the fundamental reforms needed to enable
ordinary citizens to claim our democracy from billionaires and
special interests—and limiting the government’s interest to fighting
corruption (as narrowly understood as possible) has been the antiregulatory justices’ primary tool.
While important work remains to defend the few remaining
effective campaign finance laws on the books, now is the time to turn
our attention to achieving the type of transformative change in the
legal-constitutional landscape that will enable policy advocates to
once again go on the offensive to start building a democracy in which
the strength of a citizen’s voice no longer depends upon the size of
her wallet. In short, we must clarify that the founders never intended
the First Amendment to be a tool for use by wealthy donors to
dominate our political discourse by crowding out the rest of America.
Moreover, there is room under the First Amendment to regulate
money in politics to promote political equality or other important
values that help us achieve a truly representative government.
This will not be a straightforward path, and many unanswered
questions pave the road ahead. The biggest question is how to get
from here to there. After all, I am proposing that the Supreme Court
249
recognize either an interest it has flatly rejected as recently as 2011
250
and as completely as in the Court’s seminal campaign finance case,
or an untested alternative.
Over the past several years, scholars have proposed various
theoretical pathways out of the current jurisprudential box. Some of
251
these build out from the concept of corruption.
Other theories
Aggregate Contribution Limits, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG (Oct. 2013).
249
See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2806.
250
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
251
See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341
(2009) (proposing a wholesale reimagining of the idea of corruption, moving away
from the narrow quid pro quo conception of the Citizens United Court and towards an
institutional view that she grounds in the founders’ conception of a working
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speak to the effective workings of democracy itself.
And, some
propose additional compelling government interests in regulating
money that the Supreme Court has not considered or accepted, such
253
as maximizing citizen participation or protecting candidates’ and
elected officials’ time from the constant demands of fundraising so
254
that they may focus adequately on the tasks of governance.
And, of course, there is the equality interest itself. Just because
the Court has rejected a specific interest in the past does not mean it
cannot change paths. The compelling new social science research
described above provides an important reason for the Court to
reconsider its antipathy towards political equality in the domain of
political speech. And the new justices that ascend to the bench in the
coming years may well bring different views and life experiences

democracy); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) (articulating the concept of “dependence corruption,”
which results when candidates for elected office, and thereby elected officials, exhibit
a dependence upon a separate class of funders rather than on “the People” alone).
Rick Hasen has argued that dependence corruption is simply a slightly different
articulation of what is ultimately a political equality argument. See Rick Hasen, Is
“Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance
Reform? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220851. Robert Post, on the
other hand, sees the argument as substantively different in that it is grounded in a
particular conception of representation. See Robert Post, Representative Democracy: The
Constitutional Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 179.
252
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 245, 252–53 (2002) (noting the importance of “the Constitution’s general
participatory self-government objective” and affirming that “[t]he First Amendment’s
constitutional role is not simply one of protecting the individual’s ‘negative’ freedom
from governmental restraint. The Amendment in context also forms a necessary
part of a constitutional system designed to sustain that democratic selfgovernment.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer J.,
concurring) (“[B]y limiting the size of the largest contributions, [campaign finance]
restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear on
the electoral process. . . . In doing so, they seek to build public confidence in that
process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support,
encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment
itself presupposes.”). See also Representative Democracy: The Constitutional Theory of
Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 179 (developing a theory of “discursive
democracy” which would sanction regulations that foster “electoral integrity” and
hence democratic legitimacy by causing citizens to believe subjectively that their
representatives are responsive to public opinion).
253
See generally Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259
(2012).
254
See generally Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling
Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 669 (2006).
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255

along with them.
This potential transformation of the jurisprudence that governs
the role of money in politics will not take place in a vacuum. As
noted above, the People have noticed the predicament the Court has
put us in—and they are not sitting on their hands. There is a
burgeoning movement to amend the U.S. Constitution to directly fix
what the Court has mangled over forty years. As of this writing,
sixteen states and more than five hundred municipalities have passed
resolutions calling on Congress to propose a constitutional
amendment to overturn Citizens United, Buckley, and/or the doctrine
256
of corporate constitutional rights more generally.
My own views on the various constitutional rationales described
above are the subject for another day. Suffice it to say, for now, there
is plenty of work ahead for scholars, lawyers, judges, and concerned
citizens who stand ready to, finally, construct a democratic republic
that lives up to its professed ideals.
V. CONCLUSION
Let us return to where we started, and answer the questions
posed at the start of this Article. Why has debate in Washington
centered on cutting deficits when most Americans consider creating
jobs a higher priority? Why did Congress enact severe across-theboard budget cuts that fall heavily on the backs of the neediest
citizens, and then move swiftly to exempt relatively well-off airline
travelers from the impact of these cuts? Because the wealthy
prioritize cutting deficits over creating jobs; and because the U.S.
government responds differentially (and often exclusively) to the
preferences of the wealthy. And, this is in large part because the U.S.

255

The average age of the five eldest justices is seventy five, and three of these five
(Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) are conservatives who do not support an
equality-based campaign finance jurisprudence. So, a shift in the Court’s perspective
could be driven by impending retirements and the ideology of justices appointed by
presidents motivated to secure their own constitutional views across time. But, it
could also be driven to some degree by the generational impact of the Inequality
Era. The elder justices entered adulthood in the 1950s and 1960s—just before
America’s income and wealth gap became an ever-widening chasm. HACKER &
PIERSON, supra note 43 (citing the 1970s as a breaking point in economic inequality
in America). Critically, some of the justices that will ascend to the bench in the next
decade may have come of age or entered economic life as that chasm was expanding,
and therefore have a different take on the proper relationship between capitalism
and democracy. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Buckley was decided in 1976.
256
Local
and
State
Resolutions,
UNITED
FOR
THE
PEOPLE,
http://www.united4thepeople.org/local.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
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Supreme Court, through a simplistic and impoverished First
Amendment jurisprudence, has shaped a democracy in which the
strength of a citizen’s voice depends upon the size of her wallet.
Breaking this vicious cycle—in which the wealthy minority
control political outcomes, only to write economic rules that further
concentrate prosperity in the hands of the few, who can then exert an
even tighter grip on the political process—is the defining legal battle
of our generation. The fight for racial equity was the cornerstone
legal struggle of the prior generation.
After legal advocacy,
grassroots organizing, and blood in the streets, we have eliminated
formal race discrimination and made substantial (although decidedly
257
incomplete) progress against de facto discrimination. In addition,
the current generation has embraced equality with respect to sexual
258
There
orientation as a natural successor to racial equality claims.
have been a number of victories in state courts, legislatures, and
ballot initiatives, and the last Supreme Court term brought important
259
progress on this front as well.
Given the stark generational
differences on this issue, victories for full equality have taken on an
air of inevitability.
These critical fights are about safeguarding existing protections
and consolidating victories. This generation’s defining battle must be
a drive for forward progress, going from zero to sixty, likely over
several decades. The United States is fast becoming defined by
unprecedented political and economic inequality, and we now stand
at a crossroads. In the wake of Citizens United, we will either pick
ourselves up and fight our way towards a truly representative
257

Make no mistake, our generation must carry forward the torch of racial equity.
The 2012 elections saw a spate of mostly partisan-motivated, but highly raciallyconsequential efforts to deny Americans their fundamental right and freedom to
vote. See, e.g., Wendy R. Weiser & Diana Kasdan, Voting Law Changes: Election Update,
THE
BRENNAN
CENTER
FOR
JUSTICE
(2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voting_Law
_Changes_Election_Update.pdf. In spite of these current challenges, and the fact
that both the Department of Justice and the D.C. District Court have used the
Section 5 “pre-clearance” procedures in the Voting Rights Act to block racially
discriminatory voting changes in the past year, the Supreme Court recently struck
the Act’s coverage formula. Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 151.
258
Perhaps the clearest indication that this represents a generational sea change
is that the nation’s leading coalition of civil rights organization recently changed its
name from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to the Leadership Conference
on Civil and Human Rights, a move clearly intended to accommodate the Human
Rights Campaign and other leading LGBT rights groups.
259
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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democracy, or we will continue our recent slide towards plutocracy.
We will take decisive action to break and reverse the vicious cycle of
economic and political domination by the wealthy minority, or we
will allow the cycle to spin out of control—possibly until it builds too
much momentum to stop peacefully.
To choose representative democracy, we must rescue our
Constitution. This is the task to which the great legal minds of our
day must apply themselves. No less than the fate of the Republic is at
stake.

